By Bruce Pannier

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) says Azerbaijan has given it one month to halt its operations in the country and that Baku provided «no explanation» for the decision.

OSCE spokesman Shiv Sharma told RFE/RL on June 5 that Azerbaijani authorities this week «informed us of their intentions of closing the office» of its project coordinator in Baku and that the 57-member security organization is «now assessing our options.»

The move comes amid heightened criticism of Azerbaijan’s record on civil society and media freedoms by Western officials and international human rights watchdogs.

Rights groups say Baku has escalated its efforts to muzzle government opponents since Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was reelected for a third term in 2013.

The Vienna-based OSCE has been a prominent voice among those critics.

In November, its media freedoms representative, Dunja Mijatovic, said that «practically all independent media representatives and media NGOs» in Azerbaijan «have been purposefully persecuted under various, often unfounded and disturbing charges.»

Azerbaijan has bristled at Western criticism of its human rights record, saying such censure lacks objectivity.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, which notified the OSCE that Baku was terminating an agreement allowing the organization to operate in the country, had not commented publicly on the situation as of June 5.

Azerbaijan’s human rights record has also faced increasing international scrutiny in the run-up to the European Games, an Olympics-style event limited to athletes from Europe that is set to open on June 12.

Status Downgrade

EU lawmakers last month called on Azerbaijan to release individuals widely seen as political prisoners ahead of the games and urged European leaders to skip the event’s opening ceremony in Baku.

The OSCE office in Baku was downgraded to the office of a «project coordinator,» reportedly at Azerbaijan’s request, in January 2014.

The downgrade of the mission came at the request of the Azerbaijani government, which cited the country’s «significant progress» since the OSCE office in Baku was opened in 1999.

Khadija Ismayilova, a journalist and contributor to RFE/RL currently jailed in Azerbaijan on a series of charges that have been internationally condemned as politically motivated, testified before U.S. lawmakers in November that the downgrade had led to a halt of «most» of the OSCE office’s projects «related to media and combating corruption.»

Among other duties, the OSCE coordinator had been tasked with «implementing OSCE principles and commitments» and «maintaining contacts» with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local authorities, universities, and research institutions.

NGOs have been among the numerous targets of a crackdown by Azerbaijani authorities, including groups promoting free-media efforts in Azerbaijan.

In April, the Council of Europe’s human rights commissioner, Nils Muiznieks, said «human rights defenders are harassed through restrictive NGO legislation and selectively targeted with criminal prosecutions on charges that defy credibility.»

RFE/RL last month closed its Baku bureau after Azeri authorities sealed the office shut last December in connection with the government-led campaign against foreign organizations. RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, however, continues to operate on digital and satellite platforms.

RFE/RL Editor in Chief Nenad Pejic said on May 22 that the Azerbaijani authorities had acted «illegally and arbitrarily.»

Azerbaijani ‘Masters’

Azerbaijan’s move to close the OSCE office comes just days after the contract of the organization’s project coordinator in Baku, France’s Alexis Chahtahtinsky, expired.

Novruz Mammadov, the deputy head of Aliyev’s administration and director of its Foreign Relations Department, suggested on Twitter on June 1 that Chahtahtinsky was relieved of his duties because of U.S. objections to the French diplomat’s public appearance with Aliyev.

Mammadov appeared to be referring to a July 2014 statement by Daniel Baer, the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, in which he criticized Chahtahtinsky for being photographed with Aliyev and Azerbaijan’s foreign minister but not «with civil society.»

«While consultation with the host government is certainly an important part of your work, you work for all of us, and you work for the principles that underlie this organization. Your masters are not the government of Azerbaijan,» Baer said, addressing Chahtahtinsky in the statement.

Baer did not respond to a request for comment in time for publication.

But France’s ambassador to the OSCE, Maxime Lefebvre, told RFE/RL that the decision not to renew Chahtahtinsky’s contract was not linked to politics or OSCE-Azerbaijani ties, but rather to «internal management problems.»

Lefebvre said the OSCE «would like Azerbaijan to remain committed» to the organization and «would like the mission to continue its work.»

He added that it would be regrettable if the decision to close the Baku office was confirmed, «because we think it’s important that we keep a field presence of the OSCE in Azerbaijan and that we maintain good relations between Azerbaijan as a participating state with the OSCE.»

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/27055923.html

By Farangis Najibullah

It wasn’t so long ago that Farrukh Sharifov had settled into a home in Syria with a group of fellow Islamic State (IS) group recruits, believing he was there to fight the good fight.

Now the 25-year-old is back in his native Tajikistan, helping the government prevent others from following his path to militancy.

Sharifov is among a small number of former IS fighters who’ve taken Dushanbe up on its offer to grant amnesties to Tajiks who voluntarily leave the radical militant group and who are deemed not to be a threat to society.

Those who pass the vetting process and are amnestied are spared criminal charges upon their return, but the state has put some, like Sharifov, to good use.

Eloquent and fluent in Tajik and Russian, Sharifov tells packed audiences about the horrors he witnessed during his monthlong stint in the IS stronghold of Raqqa earlier this year. He describes seeing people summarily executed without trial, women used as sex slaves, and militants putting severed heads on display as a warning to anyone who dares challenge their strict interpretation of Islam.

A Forgiving Approach

Countries around the world are considering what to do in the event that citizens of theirs who left to join IS decide to come back.

In the case of Tajikistan, some of the hundreds who went to fight in Iraq and and Syria have vowed to return home and wage war against the government in Dushanbe.

But despite the significant threat posed by IS-trained militants, Tajikistan has opted for a forgiving approach for those who had no previous affiliation with terrorist or extremist groups and who repent for joining IS.

«Young people who took part in military conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and other countries but have realized their mistake, regret their action, and voluntarily leave the conflict zone … will be allowed to return home,» the Ministry of Internal Affair announced on May 9, clarifying the conditions of the long-standing amnesty offer.

It’s up to those individuals to find their way to Turkey or other states, but once there the government will provide them assistance in getting their documents together and setting them up with transportation home.

It also offers assistance — for those who leave IS-controlled territories and reach Turkey – in obtaining passports and tickets to come home.

In order to convince prospective returnees that the offer is genuine, the ministry has set up a hotline, called the Trust Line, that fighters considering a return can call.

Six Tajiks Have Returned

Contacted by RFE/RL, an operator said the Trust Line has received «several phone calls» — including from fighters in Syria and their relatives in Tajikistan — since it was set up on May 9.

«When a Tajik fighter calls from abroad and asks for help to come home, our officers and psychologists talk to them to identify the fighter and their intentions,» the operator said.

At least six Tajiks, including a young woman, have returned from Syria in recent months.

After being questioned by authorities, five of the returnees were granted full amnesties and set free. One is to go on trial in Dushanbe after being charged with taking part in a foreign military conflict.

Officials in Dushanbe’s Somoni district court said «the details of the case will be made public in coming days.»

The Tajik government, which fought a five-year civil war with its Islamic opposition in the 1990s, is no stranger to the threats posed by home-grown militancy.

The eastern Rasht Valley, a former stronghold of the Islamic opposition, has seen a string of deadly militant attacks, including an ambush in 2010 that left 25 government troops dead.

The same month, Tajikistan suffered its first suicide bombing when a police headquarters in the northern city of Khujand was targeted.

That attack was blamed on an alleged member of the banned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist group the government says has many supporters in Tajikistan, and parts of which have expressed allegiance to IS in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Despite potential security risks by the new breed of IS-trained militants, many Tajiks support the amnesty, with some hailing it as a second chance for «young people who have recognized their mistakes.»

«Some of the fighters have, indeed, gone to Syria and Iraq for the so-called jihad, but there are many others who went there just to make money,» says Abdulghani Mamadazimov, the head of Tajikistan’s Association of Political Scientists.

«Many were migrant laborers who were recruited in Russia and Kazakhstan,» Mamadazimov said. «They were promised money.»

There is currently no rehabilitation program in place to aid the returnees’ reintegration, but the authorities are giving assurances that they will be free to resume their work or education.

‘There Is No Religion’

Rizvon Ahmadov, a former IS fighter who has recently returned from Raqqa, told Tajik state TV that there are many Tajiks in Syria willing to leave the IS group.

Ahmadov, 22, said he went to Syria to fight for a religious cause and spent nine months there undergoing militant training.

«But there is no religion,» Ahmadov said. «When they occupy a place, they kill local men and marry or sell their wives. They rape women and sell children. They oppress people living there.»

Disillusioned and deeply traumatized by IS atrocities, Ahmadov and fellow Tajik Mavjuda Saburova managed to escape to Turkey and sought help from the Tajik Embassy.

Officials say first-hand accounts of IS horrors will help prevent young Tajiks from being swayed by extremist propaganda.

Former militant Sharifov frequently accompanies government officials and religious leaders as they meet with people across the country as part of Dushanbe’s antiextremism campaign.

Since his first public appearance at a gathering moderated by Interior Minister Ramazan Rahimzoda on May 7, Rahimov’s schedule has been packed with meetings and speeches.

Rahimov even recently gave a speech at the Dushanbe Grand Mosque during a sermon after Friday Prayers, an honor normally reserved only for chief imams.

http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-islamic-state-militants-amnesty/27054985.html

The Tajik government’s current dilemma is the most recent proof of the ancient adage that you reap what you sow, but the message doesn’t appear to be getting through.

The Tajik government has a substantial problem, and it has been getting plenty of international attention. Dushanbe could use some friends to address it, but instead it seems intent on harassing a group that could serve as one of its best allies at the moment: the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (HNIT).

The problem is the defection of elite security-force commander Gulmurod Halimov to the Islamic State (IS) militant group. Or more specifically, the problem is the 12-minute IS recruitment video in which the former Tajik OMON commander alternately chastises and threatens his former employer and others. The video is designed to project the grievances of a state servant but also a pious Muslim against the clumsy attempts of a corrupt government to control the practice of Islam, and unfortunately such claims cannot be wholly dismissed.

The Tajik government has undeniably been trying to control the course of Islam in the country by, among other things, regulating the age at which males may start attending mosque, forbidding women from attending mosque, ordering clerics to wear state-approved uniforms in which to preach, and providing a list of approved topics for sermons and in some cases simply supplying texts to be read at prayers. Halimov mentioned a few of these regulations.

There are more examples. But to sum it up quickly, it is ultimately the state that approves clerics, and they serve in state-approved mosques and teach at state-approved madrasahs and often include Tajikistan’s president in their Friday Prayers.

One of the interesting aspects (to me, at least) of Halimov’s enlistment in the IS and subsequent criticism of the Tajik government is that he is from the only Central Asian country where there is a legally registered Islamic political party: the HNIT (sometimes known as the IRPT).

Tajik authorities could use some strong statements from the HNIT both condemning Halimov’s comments and endorsing the Tajik government, but that is extremely unlikely to happen.

Official Islam, Or Else

It must be mentioned that the HNIT leadership has spoken out against IS many times.

But that has not stopped the Tajik government from working to marginalize the HNIT — some now say with the aim of eventually removing the party from the scene in Tajikistan.

The HNIT and the government led by President Emomali Rahmon were opponents during the 1992-97 Tajik civil war but agreed to a one-of-a-kind peace deal that ended hostilities and gave the HNIT 30 percent of the positions in the government, from local to ministerial.

The HNIT’s share in the government was eroded over the course of the years until last March the party was finally locked out of the government entirely following dubious parliamentary elections that saw Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan win an outright majority, with the rest of the seats going to parties supporting the president.

Many people, and I’ll name David Trilling (@dtrilling) and Edward Lemon (@EdwardLemon3) among them, noted how short-sighted this move by the government was to prevent the HNIT, the largest opposition party in Tajikistan, from winning even the token two or three seats it had held in parliament for a decade.

There have been many times in the past when the HNIT and Rahmon’s government were able to cooperate to achieve common goals. The HNIT has supported government efforts as recently as 2011 to track down, and often eliminate, rogue HNIT commanders from the civil-war days. During the shaky first few years after the civil war, the HNIT even offered military help to government forces crushing the last of the pro-government paramilitary forces, once useful but inconvenient after peace was reached.

In view of the new propaganda video from former OMON commander Halimov, this might be a good time to renew the cooperation of years past.

Instead, HNIT deputy leaders Saidamar Husayni and Mahmadali Hayit met with Supreme Court Chairman Shermuhammad Shohiyon on May 30 to complain about the Interior Ministry’s harassment of HNIT members and their families, as well as «cases of forcing party members to quit the party.» The two leaders handed over a 189-page complaint to the court.

Reaping What They Sow

It was only the latest in a series of incidents over many years involving the HNIT, usually the release of compromising material or videos but also including the deaths and beatings of party members in not-fully-explained circumstances.

Similar, though not quite as severe, techniques have been used to sideline influential moderate clerics who would not strictly follow the government line.

The HNIT probably cannot help convince Tajik nationals who have already gone to join IS to forsake the militant group and return home. Tajiks in IS would probably view the HNIT as heretics for cooperating with a secular government.

But the HNIT is influential among the faithful in Tajikistan. Those considering whether to leave and go to Syria or Iraq will not be dissuaded by the sermons of state clerics condemning the IS in one sentence then in the next breath praising officials whom the majority of the population considers corrupt.

They might however, listen to former government opponents with much cleaner Islamic credentials when they condemn the IS.

— Bruce Pannier, with Salimjon Aioubov and Mirzo Salimov of RFE/RL’s Tajik Service

http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-has-government-lost-chance-to-speak-to-muslims/27049865.html

The Tajik government’s current dilemma is the most recent proof of the ancient adage that you reap what you sow, but the message doesn’t appear to be getting through.

The Tajik government has a substantial problem, and it has been getting plenty of international attention. Dushanbe could use some friends to address it, but instead it seems intent on harassing a group that could serve as one of its best allies at the moment: the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (HNIT).

The problem is the defection of elite security-force commander Gulmurod Halimov to the Islamic State (IS) militant group. Or more specifically, the problem is the 12-minute IS recruitment video in which the former Tajik OMON commander alternately chastises and threatens his former employer and others. The video is designed to project the grievances of a state servant but also a pious Muslim against the clumsy attempts of a corrupt government to control the practice of Islam, and unfortunately such claims cannot be wholly dismissed.

The Tajik government has undeniably been trying to control the course of Islam in the country by, among other things, regulating the age at which males may start attending mosque, forbidding women from attending mosque, ordering clerics to wear state-approved uniforms in which to preach, and providing a list of approved topics for sermons and in some cases simply supplying texts to be read at prayers. Halimov mentioned a few of these regulations.

There are more examples. But to sum it up quickly, it is ultimately the state that approves clerics, and they serve in state-approved mosques and teach at state-approved madrasahs and often include Tajikistan’s president in their Friday Prayers.

One of the interesting aspects (to me, at least) of Halimov’s enlistment in the IS and subsequent criticism of the Tajik government is that he is from the only Central Asian country where there is a legally registered Islamic political party: the HNIT (sometimes known as the IRPT).

Tajik authorities could use some strong statements from the HNIT both condemning Halimov’s comments and endorsing the Tajik government, but that is extremely unlikely to happen.

Official Islam, Or Else

It must be mentioned that the HNIT leadership has spoken out against IS many times.

But that has not stopped the Tajik government from working to marginalize the HNIT — some now say with the aim of eventually removing the party from the scene in Tajikistan.

The HNIT and the government led by President Emomali Rahmon were opponents during the 1992-97 Tajik civil war but agreed to a one-of-a-kind peace deal that ended hostilities and gave the HNIT 30 percent of the positions in the government, from local to ministerial.

The HNIT’s share in the government was eroded over the course of the years until last March the party was finally locked out of the government entirely following dubious parliamentary elections that saw Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan win an outright majority, with the rest of the seats going to parties supporting the president.

Many people, and I’ll name David Trilling (@dtrilling) and Edward Lemon (@EdwardLemon3) among them, noted how short-sighted this move by the government was to prevent the HNIT, the largest opposition party in Tajikistan, from winning even the token two or three seats it had held in parliament for a decade.

There have been many times in the past when the HNIT and Rahmon’s government were able to cooperate to achieve common goals. The HNIT has supported government efforts as recently as 2011 to track down, and often eliminate, rogue HNIT commanders from the civil-war days. During the shaky first few years after the civil war, the HNIT even offered military help to government forces crushing the last of the pro-government paramilitary forces, once useful but inconvenient after peace was reached.

In view of the new propaganda video from former OMON commander Halimov, this might be a good time to renew the cooperation of years past.

Instead, HNIT deputy leaders Saidamar Husayni and Mahmadali Hayit met with Supreme Court Chairman Shermuhammad Shohiyon on May 30 to complain about the Interior Ministry’s harassment of HNIT members and their families, as well as «cases of forcing party members to quit the party.» The two leaders handed over a 189-page complaint to the court.

Reaping What They Sow

It was only the latest in a series of incidents over many years involving the HNIT, usually the release of compromising material or videos but also including the deaths and beatings of party members in not-fully-explained circumstances.

Similar, though not quite as severe, techniques have been used to sideline influential moderate clerics who would not strictly follow the government line.

The HNIT probably cannot help convince Tajik nationals who have already gone to join IS to forsake the militant group and return home. Tajiks in IS would probably view the HNIT as heretics for cooperating with a secular government.

But the HNIT is influential among the faithful in Tajikistan. Those considering whether to leave and go to Syria or Iraq will not be dissuaded by the sermons of state clerics condemning the IS in one sentence then in the next breath praising officials whom the majority of the population considers corrupt.

They might however, listen to former government opponents with much cleaner Islamic credentials when they condemn the IS.

— Bruce Pannier, with Salimjon Aioubov and Mirzo Salimov of RFE/RL’s Tajik Service

http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-has-government-lost-chance-to-speak-to-muslims/27049865.html