Testimony
Robert O. Blake, Jr.
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Washington, DC
March 10, 2011

Chairman Burton, members of the committee: Thank you for inviting me, I welcome the opportunity today to speak with you regarding U.S. policy in Central Asia and the partnerships we have with the countries of this important region.
Why is Central Asia important to the U.S.?
The United States has an important interest in promoting a stable, secure, democratic and prosperous Central Asia. These interests shape our core U.S. policy objectives, which are: encouraging Central Asia’s help in stabilizing Afghanistan; promoting democracy; combating narcotics trafficking; promoting balanced energy policies and non-proliferation; and fostering competitive market economies.
While pursuing these interests often poses serious challenges, robust engagement and assistance to the countries of Central Asia remain important to stability in the region and to achieving our goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Over the past two years, we have worked to broaden the atmosphere of trust and strengthen relations with the governments and people of the Central Asian countries. We aim to create stronger partners for the United States in addressing common yet critical global issues encompassing a broad spectrum of challenges, from Afghanistan to non-proliferation to counter-narcotics to energy security. Collaboration with European partners and increased cooperation with Russia and China are critical to addressing these and other issues facing Central Asia. With careful and continued engagement by all partners, including the Central Asian countries themselves, Central Asia could help reinvigorate economic and trade links between the economies of Western Europe and Russia, the energy resources of Central Asia, and the emerging economies of India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, bringing sustainable prosperity to the entire region.
To strengthen our engagement with Central Asia, in December 2009 we instituted Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) with each country. Each ABC constitutes a face-to-face structured dialogue, based on a jointly developed, comprehensive agenda that facilitates candid discussions on the full spectrum of bilateral priorities, including human rights, religious freedom, science and technology collaboration, economic development, defense cooperation, and any other issue that either side would like to bring to the table. Each discussion results in a work plan to address key priorities and outline practical steps to advance U.S. policy goals. The road to achieving these goals is not always a smooth one, but our continued engagement with the region is yielding important results that I will discuss below.
We also continue to view our assistance funding to the region as a critical tool in accomplishing our policy goals. We conducted a thorough review of our assistance programs in Central Asia to ensure that they are closely linked with our priorities. The President’s Fiscal 2012 budget request includes a 6% decrease in funding for the region compared to budgeted levels for Central Asia in FY 2010. This decrease reflects our commitment to a lean, strategically targeted budget that will advance our interests in Central Asia. The most important of these is the support of Central Asian states for international efforts in Afghanistan.
Central Asia’s assistance in Afghanistan
Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy. A stable future for Afghanistan depends on the continued engagement of its Central Asian neighbors — just as a stable, prosperous future for the Central Asian states is linked to bringing peace, stability and prosperity to Afghanistan.
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is an important route for getting non-lethal supplies into Afghanistan for U.S. and coalition forces. In addition, the great majority of our troops in Afghanistan pass through the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan. This year we have focused on expanding the capacity of the Northern Distribution Network to offer multiple, alternate routes for our cargo transiting into Afghanistan. These routes are becoming an increasingly important component of our bilateral relationships in the region. Several Central Asian countries have also maintained their own assistance programs, such as Kazakhstan’s effort to educate Afghan students, or Uzbekistan’s and Turkmenistan’s provision of much-needed electricity to Afghanistan.
But our relations with Central Asia are by no means limited to cooperation on Afghanistan. We have a broad agenda encompassing everything from counterterrorism and counternarcotics to democracy promotion, protection of human rights, and economic development. I will now briefly highlight key issues in our relations with each country.
Kazakhstan
Our relations with Kazakhstan are perhaps our deepest and broadest in Central Asia, with cooperation across a broad range of fields as diverse as non-proliferation, support to Afghanistan, energy and health. Kazakhstan has been a global leader on nuclear nonproliferation since its earliest days of independence when it renounced its nuclear weapons and closed the nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. The U.S. and Kazakhstan completed in 2010 a long and complicated project to safely shut down Kazakhstan’s BN-350 reactor, secure the weapons-grade spent fuel it produced, enough to build up to 775 nuclear weapons, and then package and transport the spent fuel more than 2,100 miles for secure storage in Eastern Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan is the economic powerhouse of Central Asia. President Nazarbayev’s decision to invite major oil companies to develop the country’s vast hydrocarbon resources in the 1990s was a game-changer for Kazakhstan’s future. Already a significant oil producer, Kazakhstan will account for one of the largest increases in non-OPEC supply to the global market in the next 10-15 years as its oil production doubles to reach 3 million barrels a day by 2020.
Kazakhstan provides vital logistical support to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through the NDN. Kazakhstan is also investing in Afghanistan’s next generation of leaders through a $50 million scholarship program to educate one thousand Afghan students in Kazakhstan’s universities.
While Kazakhstan is growing in other ways, we continue to encourage the government to enhance democracy, human rights and the role of civil society. Following a failed attempt to extend President Nazarbayev’s term by referendum, Kazakhstan will hold early presidential elections on April 3, 2011. We and the international community see these elections as an important opportunity to strengthen the electoral process.
Uzbekistan
Over the past two years, we have worked hard to build stronger bilateral relations with Uzbekistan. In February, I led a delegation to Tashkent to hold the second round of Annual Bilateral Consultations. Our dialogue encompassed four key areas of the bilateral relationship: political, security, economic, development, as well as democratic reform.
In the regional security field, Uzbekistan remains a valued partner for its participation in NDN and its role in Afghanistan reconstruction. A few years ago Uzbekistan began a new effort to export reasonably-priced electricity to Afghanistan, which dramatically increased power supplied in the north of the country and continues to keep the lights on in Kabul to this day. Uzbekistan has facilitated transit for essential supplies to coalition forces in Afghanistan. Its national rail company, with funding from the Asian Development Bank, constructed an important railroad line that links the southern Uzbek city of Khairaton to the northern Afghanistan city of Mazar-e Sharif. The railroad will help boost trade between Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan also played a constructive role during the outbreak of ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan last year by working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and accepting large numbers of ethnic Uzbek refugees. Through our increased engagement, we have seen an improved relationship with Uzbekistan, but many challenges remain.
We continue to hold a dialogue to encourage the Uzbek authorities to address significant human rights concerns including ending forced child labor in the cotton harvest, opening up the media environment, curtailing abuses by security forces, and ending harassment of civil society and international NGOs.
We are also encouraging the government to build a more investment-friendly business environment which will enhance economic opportunities for American businesses and benefit the Uzbek economy. The high level of interest from American companies to participate in the recent business delegation that accompanied me to the ABC is evidence of the potential to build commercial ties that would produce economic benefits for both the U.S. and Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan
Helping Kyrgyzstan consolidate its successful transition last year to a parliamentary democracy remains a top priority for the United States. People around the region and beyond are watching closely and will make future judgments about the efficacy of democratic governance based on the success or failure of Kyrgyzstan. President Otunbaeva just concluded a visit to the U.S. this week, during which Secretary Clinton presented her and nine others with the International Women of Courage Award.
The end of the Bakiev regime in April 2010 opened new opportunities for engagement and democratic progress. Historic free and fair elections held on October 10, 2010 resulted in a multiparty parliamentary system of government, with an independent legislature – a first for Central Asia. U.S. assistance to help prepare the ground for the elections and ensure a fair and open process played a key role. However, concerns remain. We continue to monitor the potential for renewed ethnic violence, as tensions remain following violence in the south last June. In our interactions with the new government, we continue to encourage accountability, equal access to justice, respect for human rights and ethnic reconciliation.
The Manas Transit Center represents an important contribution by the Kyrgyz Republic to our efforts in Afghanistan. In addition to facilitating the flow of U.S. troops and supplies into Afghanistan, the Transit Center contributes to the local economy by improving employment opportunities for, and purchasing local goods from, local communities.
Tajikistan
One of the poorest countries in the world, Tajikistan is a fragile state in a volatile neighborhood. U.S. policy is to support Tajikistan in maintaining stability and creating the conditions for economic and democratic development. With the resources we put into our partnership with Tajikistan, we seek to help improve law enforcement and border security capabilities, increase food security, improve the health and education of the citizens of Tajikistan, and build good governance.
As our public reports on human rights, on the investment climate, and on religious freedom have made clear, we have concerns about the pace and direction of political developments, as well as restrictions on religious and media freedoms in Tajikistan. These continue to be important parts of our dialogue with Tajikistan.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is a country of growing importance to the United States. It has important hydrocarbon resources, and is seeking alternative routes for their distribution. One such project is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-India-Pakistan, or TAPI, pipeline, which President Berdimuhamedov is taking a leading role in getting off the ground. TAPI could help integrate the Central and South Asian regions by sending energy resources where they are most needed, and we hope that U.S. firms are involved in its development.
We also appreciate Turkmenistan’s humanitarian help to its neighbor Afghanistan by providing discounted electricity, housing and other assistance. We continue to encourage the Turkmen government to take concrete steps to fulfill its international obligations on human rights and have offered assistance to help advance Turkmenistan’s stated goals of developing a democracy.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we see a future in which the United States and the countries of Central Asia work together for peace, security, economic development, democracy and prosperity. We recognize that the pace of change is often slow and that our programs should focus on long-term, meaningful results. But through our invigorated policy dialogue and engagement, we aim to strengthen our ties with these important countries and their people and thereby advance U.S. interests in this strategically important region.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://www.america.gov)

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US Embassy in Dushanbe

Источник: http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2011/March/20110311152830su0.1882222.html&distid=ucs#ixz

The Egypt scenario that has shaken the world could spread to many post-Soviet countries where some aging presidents have been ruling for more than two decades. Seemingly tranquil now, Egypt-style civil disobedience cannot be ruled out in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Belarus – all countries where dictatorship, nepotism, and corruption are flourishing.

In developments that moved steadily from the unlikely to the surreal, longtime President Hosni Mubarak – who became one of the world’s longest-serving presidents by rigging election after election for decades – claimed he was “fed up with being president,” before finally resigning on February 11.

In reality, though, it is the Egyptian people who were fed up. The average income in Egypt is about $2,070 per household, according to the World Bank. With about 20 percent of the population living below the poverty line, Mubarak and his family have an estimated wealth of between $50 billion and $70 billion. The Mubarak family owns properties around the globe, according to an IHS Global Insight report.

Faced with the unprecedented protests, Mubarak had said he feared “chaos” if he left too abruptly, but what he really fears is investigation and prosecution, loss of his ill-gained assets, and the exposure of his corrupt dealings. All dictators become hostage to their own sins and to those of their relatives and the narrow circle of insiders that they brought up to the state feeding trough.

It is interesting to look at post-Soviet Central Asia through the prism of Egypt’s experience.

Personal Feifdom

Let’s start with Tajikistan. This small, poor Central Asian state has been ruled by Emomali Rahmon since 1992, just a year after it gained independence. The former Soviet apparatchik governs Tajikistan like a personal fiefdom, and his extended family and inner circle are the beneficiaries of years of entrenched corruption.
As is the case in Egypt, social unrest could erupt in Tajikistan because of poverty. A recent government survey in the southern Hatlon region revealed that some 70 percent of the population is essentially subsisting on bread and tea. Each resident of Hatlon spends an average of $21 a month on food.

But Tajikistan, too, is a largely quiet country where widespread misery is moderated by remarkably low expectations.

Perhaps it makes more sense to look at Kazakhstan. It has been ruled by President Nursultan Nazarbaev for more than 20 years. Now 70 years old, however, Nazarbaev has no ready male heir to hand power off to. Former Nazarbaev son-in-law Rakhat Aliev has written that the president has three wives and plans to hand off power to a son by his third wife who is now only 6 years old.

‘Don’t Leave Your Post’

Egypt clearly sent a signal to Nazarbaev. For years now, he has counted on the apathy of the Kazakh people (compared, for instance, to the neighboring Kyrgyz who seem to have developed an allergy to dictatorship). But Egypt has shown him how quickly docility can turn to unrest and turmoil. Nazarbaev cannot have failed to notice the parallels.

Nonetheless, he claims to have received another signal, this time from the Kazakh people. “The main thing,” Nazarbaev said recently, “that I have understood from our people is, ‘Don’t leave your post’ and, ‘Continue to work on.’ I promise if there is such unanimity and popular support, I will work as long as I can.”

Without an obvious successor for Nazarbaev, the ruling elites seem to have come up with a consensus that it is necessary to freeze the status quo. As is the case with Mubarak, Nazarbaev and his inner circle are hostages to their own pasts. He simply must manage the transition to a successor or risk being swept up in a flood of popular rage.

The parallels with Egypt are significant. The Kazakh people have collected insults for many years, just like the Egyptians. There has been no way for them to vent their energies and a thousand undiscussed questions have accumulated under the thumb of the authorities.

Neighboring Turkmenistan also has bitter experience with eternal presidents. Former leader Saparmurat Niyazov was a lifelong president until his death in 2006, and he showed the world without question that the art of the personality cult is alive and well.

This kind of political culture is highly infectious. Niyazov was followed by Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who is already treading this familiar path. He recently accepted the honorary name Arkadag (Protector). Turkmen state television recently showed an elderly woman kissing his hand, a gesture the president accepted without shame or demurral.

Recently, a parade of Turkish military servicemen paused as it passed the president and all the soldiers kneeled down before him. Later, 600 girls took to the stadium and formed the word “Arkadag” with their bodies, while participants sang a song called “Thank You, Protector.”

And, of course, neighboring Uzbekistan has followed the same path. In 2005, longtime President Islam Karimov ordered troops to fire on his own people. President since 1990, he is one of the world’s most oppressive dictators and a real time bomb.

Now he is 73. He has no sons, but his wife, Tatyana Karimova, is an economist by training, and they have two daughters, Gulnara and Lola. According to “Der Spiegel,” Gulnara Karimova has assets estimated at $570 million. She reportedly controls the lucrative oil and gas industries, as well as Uzbekistan’s telecom and construction sectors. Her opaque business interests are believed to extend to Moscow, Dubai, and Geneva. It is possible the Karimov family and the ruling elite would like to see her become the successor, but there are many in Uzbekistan who would oppose a continuation of the Karimov dynasty and, of course, the installation of a female leader.

After decades in power, any of these leaders could be the next to decide he is “fed up with being president.”

Cholpon Orozobekova is a Kyrgyz journalist based in Geneva. She has worked for BBC radio, RFE/RL, IWPR, and as editor in chief of the independent newspaper «De Facto.» The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/central_asian_dictators_belarus_egypt_mubarak/2306999.html

There is only one region in the world where political rights and civil liberties have been in continuous decline since 2001 — the wide swath of territory made up of countries of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states.

That’s according to Arch Puddington and Christopher Walker, the principal authors of the latest «Freedom in The World» report compiled annually by the U.S.-based rights watchdog Freedom House.

The authors say there is no general explanation for the region’s downward trend. But Puddington, Freedom House’s director of research, lists a handful of possible factors.

One is the legacy of the Soviet Union; the other is Russia’s undemocratic influence; and the third is the economic power attained by regimes in gas- and oil-rich countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

«The former Soviet Union [excluding the Baltic states] over the past five years, over the past decade, basically has gone from one decline to another decline. And Russia has led the way,» Puddington says. «But you have one of the most repressive regions in the world in Central Asia, where Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are right at the bottom of our Freedom Index. And Tajikistan also has very low scores, as does Azerbaijan.»

‘Disappointing Declines’

The two major negative developments in the former Soviet space, according to the report, is the disputed presidential election in Belarus in December, which was followed by a violent crackdown on protesters, and the overall decline in freedom in Ukraine.
«Ukraine was the one country in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union that we had ranked as ‘free’ — as a free country — the only country in that region,» he says. «And after last year’s developments, we now rank Ukraine as ‘partly free.’ And we can say that this is for a single country one of the most important and disappointing declines for 2010.»

Walker, Freedom House’s director of studies, says the negative trends in Ukraine include curbs on press freedom, the intimidation of civil society, and greater government influence on the judiciary.

«Ironically, President [Viktor] Yanukovych’s election victory last year was, in many ways, an unexpected democratic inheritance of the Orange Revolution,» Walker says. «The areas that we saw improvements from the end of 2004 until [2010] were precisely the areas that have come under greatest stress during the last year. So this would be the election process, media openness, and civil society.»

Members of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, however, were quick to dispute the report’s findings.

“We in the Regions Party can only perplexed by this,» said the party’s deputy chairman in parliament, Vadym Kolesnichenko, who spoke to RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service.

«For seven months we’ve been talking about this absurd topic under the heading of “freedom of speech” and “censorship of the media” but no one has been able to show one single concrete example. So this classification can only perceived with amazement — particularly when there are claims that we are enemies of the opposition. I don’t think any country has demonstrated a more loyal attitude towards the opposition, which does nothing and stops us from working,” Kolesnichenko said.

With Ukraine’s slide to the «partly free» category, there are now no countries ranked «free» in the former Soviet Union, with the notable exception of the three Baltic states.

‘Increased Brazenness’

But even in the Baltic states, Walker says, the picture is far from rosy, with Latvia deserving special attention. Controversy surrounds the ownership change in 2010 of «Diena,» Latvia’s main daily newspapers, which has raised serious concerns about the coverage of meaningful political events in the country. This media transparency issue negatively affects the overall democratic process in Latvia, according to the report.

Russia and Belarus were listed among the world’s most powerful authoritarian regimes, along with Iran, China, and Venezuela. These countries, according to Freedom House, acted with «increased brazenness» in 2010.

In the former Soviet space, Walker says Russia, which was named «not free,» continued to set the tone.

«[The] cases of [laywer] Sergei Magnitsky and [jailed oil tycoon] Mikhail Khodorkovsky at the end of the year in many ways exemplified the depths of the corruption not only of the judicial system in Russia but of the wider systemic challenges that the country faces,» Walker says. «Because what you’ve seen in both of these cases is the intersection of interests that come together to prevent any sort of rule of law being exercised.»

The media sector in Russia, according to Freedom House, has been unable to examine important issues in a meaningful and ongoing basis; the judiciary is subjected to heavy interference and is unable to operate in an independent manner; and political activities are strictly sanctioned and devised in a way that there is no meaningful accountability across institutions.

Despite the grim overall picture, Paddington and Walker say there were bright spots in 2010, notably in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Georgia.

«Kyrgyzstan showed some gains after all the commotion early in the year when [President Kurmanbek] Bakiev was forced out,» Puddington says. «You’ve had a new constitution, and you’ve had elections that were pretty good, and you’ve had a new government that seems superior to the old Bakiev government.»

Iran’s Slide

Iran was identified as being on a downward trend and received the «not free» label. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ rising economic and political clout was singled out as a reason for Iran’s slide, as was the «sentencing of the entire leadership of the Baha’i community to lengthy prison terms.»

Across the globe, a total of 25 countries showed significant declines in 2010, more than double the 11 countries exhibiting noteworthy gains. The number of countries designated as «free» fell from 89 to 87, and the number of electoral democracies dropped to 115, far below the 2005 figure of 123.

Other significant developments included the downgrade of Mexico from «free» to «partly free» due to incidents related to ongoing drug wars and resulting violence and intimidation. Another negative development regarding freedom was China’s vigorous campaign against the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to jailed democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo.

At the Washington release of the report, Michael Posner, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, pointed to its value in helping shape U.S. foreign policy:

«We start with a commitment to the fidelity of the truth and this report gives us a lot of information [and] a lot of detail about what’s actually happening in the world. That’s a basis for action,» he said.

However, Posner added that attempting to force change from outside is difficult, and while foreign governments can seek to cultivate the conditions for a freer society, its source is ultimately the people of the country themselves.

with contributions from RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service

Nikola Krastev, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/freedom_house_freedom_in_the_world_report/2275173.html

Tajik authorities will be employing a new tool in their long-running effort to keep tabs on all things religious.

The country’s Religious Affairs Committee has announced that, in cooperation with the state-backed Islamic Council, it is compiling a list of some 60 topics deemed suitable for sermons, and will soon distribute the list to imams across the country.

But critics, notably activists from the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party, have condemned the decision, decrying it as an attempt by the state to curtail imams’ rising influence and support among their followers, especially the young.

Addressing the controversy, Religious Affairs Committee deputy head Mukhtor Mavlonov said that the endeavor was intended to help promote Islamic values while at the same time lessening the threat of terrorism and extremism in society.

Mavlonov explained that the list of subjects for sermons focused mainly on virtues, such as respect for parents and kindness to neighbors. «They are composed of Islamic teachings on ethics, on how to raise children and teach them honesty, trustworthiness, friendship, and other moral values,» Mavlonov said.

WATCH: In August, President Emomali Rahmon warned that foreign religious schools are indoctrinating Tajik students with radical Islamist ideology, and urged parents of madrasah students to bring them home.
The list, expected to be delivered to imams this month, is to be used throughout the year, and imams have been instructed to conduct their sermons in keeping with the recommended topics.

Hamdullo Rahimzoda, imam of Dushanbe’s Central Mosque, believes there is no need for such a list. «The topics we choose for sermons have always been about moral values anyway, because Islam is all about ethics and good deeds,» he says.

National Hits

Mosque sermons in Tajikistan are conducted once a week, before Friday Prayers, and usually last for an hour. The sermons have become hugely popular in Tajikistan in recent years, and attract thousands of people.

Mullo Abdurahim, the imam of Qazoqon Mosque in Dushanbe, says the number of people attending Friday Prayers in his mosque is much higher than other days, «because they especially come to listen to sermons.»

«I don’t need any help in choosing topics for homilies,» Mullo Abdurahim adds. «Judging by the fact that the mosque fills with people, who arrive an hour early, around noon, I think my sermons are appropriate and acceptable to people.»

Sermons often turn into question-and-answer sessions, where people ask the imam’s advice on how to resolve their problems, such as marital or inheritance issues.

Some preachers have become so popular that people record their sermons, which make their way to wider audiences in the form of DVDs and CDs sold in the bazaars. Sermons by Eshoni Nuriddin, imam of Turkobod mosque in the Vahdat district outside Dushanbe, and Hoji Mirzo, an imam from the southern Kulob region, have become nationwide hits.
To the Tajik authorities, however, the two prominent imams may be better-known for occasionally stepping beyond religious and ethical issues to discuss politics. They have become outspoken critics of some government policies, most notably the official ban on the Islamic head scarf in schools and offices.

Hikmatulloh Saifullozoda, an analyst from the Dushanbe-based think tank Dialog, says that the authorities are not keen to see government critics gain more influence.

«Compact discs of some sermons are very well-liked among people. And as you know, these discs were not recorded and distributed by the imams, but by people who liked sermons by Eshoni Nuriddin, Hoji Mirzo, and other prominent imams,» Saifullozoda says.

«There is a demand for such products. The authorities don’t want these [imams] to gain eminence on a national scale. They want to keep these imams under control, giving them a manual for a 15-minute-long speech with no right to transgress the boundaries.»

Risk Of Extremism?

The Tajik authorities have long been criticized for putting pressure on religious and Islamic institutions. At least 10 mosques, including the Ispechak and Qazoqon prayer houses, have been closed down in Dushanbe in recent weeks, with city officials saying they lacked operating licenses.

However, Mullo Davlat Mirzoev, imam of the Ispechak Mosque, claims that officials have for years turned down his efforts to officially register the mosque.

Islamic clothing, including the head scarf commonly worn by women, is banned in schools, while long beards and Islamic hats worn by men are frowned upon.

But government officials reject the criticism, saying the country’s citizens enjoy religious freedom.

The country has almost 300 grand mosques and 27 central city mosques.

The authorities recently ordered the return some 1,500 students from foreign madrasahs after the country’s president, Emomali Rahmon, warned they run the risk of falling into hands of preachers of terrorism and extremism.

Education officials and the Religious Affairs Committee say the returning students will be tested on their religious knowledge, and depending on the outcome will be placed in domestic, and officially approved, madrasahs or the country’s Islamic University.

RFE/RL’s Tajik Service correspondents Kayumarsi Ato and Khurshedi Hamdam contributed to this report

By Farangis Najibullah, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_government_orders_mosques/2271961.html

All five post-Soviet Central Asian states are characterized by rampant nepotism, which has arguably become the main obstacle hampering their economic and political development. Kyrgyzstan’s two post-Soviet leaders — Askar Akaev and Kurmanbek Bakiev — were both undone by the favoritism they showed their children and close relatives, a lesson that should not be lost on the heads of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors.

Bakiev, who was ousted as president in April, appointed his son and brothers to high state positions. His son, Maksim, and his brother, Janysh, in fact, became some of the most influential political figures in the country. Leading opposition figure Azimbek Beknazarov went so far in 2007 as to say that Janysh and Maksim were actually running Kyrgyzstan. While politician Omurbek Tekebaev said Kyrgyzstan had established a system of medieval nepotism in which power is distributed solely on the basis of consanguinity.

Nepotism became a great danger for Kyrgyzstan, menacing its very integrity whenever the clans that emerged around Maksim and Janysh found themselves at odds over some prize or other.

Between them, they pretty well divided Kyrgyzstan into fiefdoms. Maksim, dubbed «The Prince,» controlled key businesses, including the gems of the banking system, the media, and the financial sector. Janysh was originally the deputy head of the National Security Service. Later he headed the State Protection Service, which provides security for the president, government officials, members of parliament, and the justices of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court. In fact, he controlled all the country’s law enforcement organs, including the prosecutor’s office, the criminal investigations units, and the judiciary.

Two more presidential brothers — Marat and Adil — were ensconced in Kyrgyz embassies abroad. One is ambassador to Germany, while the other is a senior official in the embassy in Beijing.

Another brother, Kanybek, headed a village administration, while another, Akhmat, is a successful businessman and the «unofficial governor» of the family’s native Jalalabad Oblast. Another brother, Jusupbek, served as deputy director of Kyrgyzstan’s Agency for Community Development and Investment before his death in early 2006.

The End Of An Era

But this corrupt system ended in a bloody uprising in which 87 people were killed by gunfire from state security agents. I doubt Kurmanbek Bakiev foresaw the dangerous, deadly dynamic he was unleashing when he named his son to the second-highest position in a rigid vertical of power.

And how could he? Having surrounded himself with sons, brothers, and other relatives, Bakiev had no reliable circle of politicians and professionals to advise him. The political allies who helped him oust Akaev all abandoned him. Gradually, his only thought came to be how to hold on to the position his whole clan relied on despite the country’s increasingly unstable, untenable political environment. The logic of this system became fatally self-perpetuating; as his political companions abandoned him, he became increasingly dependent on his network of powerful family members.

Looking back at Akaev’s presidency, it is clear that his wife was really calling the shots. Mairam Akaeva made most key personnel decisions. A graduate of Leningrad State University, she was a professor of mechanics and president of the Meerim charity foundation. All businesspeople or officials who sought her favor would transfer funds to the foundation. After Akaev was ousted, prosecutors began looking into several cases in which state ministries allegedly illegally transferred budget funds to Meerim.

Experts have estimated that as much as 20 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP ended up in the pockets of Akaev’s family and close allies. Mairam and Akaev’s son, Aidar, were notorious for «selling» state posts. In 2006, prosecutors opened and investigated 106 criminal cases connected to Akaev’s relatives or members of his inner circle.

Akaev and his wife used to say, «all the riches we have are our books and paintings.» But in reality, his children and relatives impudently seized everything in Kyrgyzstan that glittered. Akaev installed his daughter, Bermet, as a parliament deputy and his son, Aidar, as adviser to the finance minister and parliament deputy. When both Bermet and Aidar ran for parliament in 2005, there was impudent falsification on their behalf and in favor of other members of the pro-presidential Alga Kyrgyzstan party.

But it was Akaev’s son-in-law, Adil Tojgonbaev (a Kazakh citizen and the husband of Bermet), who was the most irritating. Some journalists estimated that Tojgonbaev oversaw virtually every profitable industry in Kyrgyzstan, controlling in particular the market for alcohol. He also purportedly owned several broadcasting companies and several popular newspapers, including «Evening Bishkek.»

Ultimately, five criminal cases were initiated against him, accusing him of causing damages in the amount of $18.8 million. But Astana refused to extradite him and now he lives peacefully in Kazakhstan. He and Bermet are divorced.

The fact that Bakiev so closely followed the doomed path of his predecessor demonstrates the deep roots that corruption and nepotism have in Central Asia.

Beyond Kyrgyzstan

Across the region, family is a crucial social institution and interpersonal ties among even extended-family members are exceptionally strong. Family connections are often tied to financial support and trust among family members is far higher than levels of trust in society generally. Several generations of a family will often live together, and elders are treated with noteworthy respect. Children are taught from the beginning to rely on their families.

That’s why, despite the obvious negative examples from Kyrgyzstan showing that nepotism and the corruption it engenders are key drivers of popular discontent, other Central Asian leaders continue to practice and defend similar systems.

Suhrob Sharipov, head of the presidential Strategic Research Center in Tajikistan, told Asia-Plus that President Imomali Rahmon has the right to appoint relatives to senior posts if he judges them qualified.

«Family links have always been used and will always be used in Tajikistan,» Sharipov said. «We have such a mentality that relatives try to be close to each other. Family links will always be used in our country by everyone, no matter who is in power.»

He argued that the main reason nepotism is less prevalent in Western democracies is because families often live scattered far apart.

As might be expected from Sharipov’s analysis, several of Rahmon’s children already occupy high-level post. Twenty-three-year old son Rustam has been enjoying a meteoric rise in Tajik politics and is widely viewed as a possible presidential successor. Daughter Tahmina is believed to be a cofounder of several trading networks and of the Development Bank of Tajikistan. Hasan Sadulloev, the brother of Rahmon’s wife, is chairman of the board of the country’s largest bank, Orienbanka. He owns dozens of factories, real-estate companies, a network of restaurants, and several mass-media outlets.

In Uzbekistan, the alleged U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks recently describe President Islam Karimov’s daughter, Gulnara, as «the most hated person in the country.» According to the U.S. diplomats in those texts, she «bites off a slice» of every profitable business in the country and has earned the nickname «the queen of thieves.» Gulnara has long lived in Geneva, where her Zeromax holding company is registered. She also spends considerable time in Spain.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev once joked that «my salary as president is very small, so my children are helping me.» According to «Forbes» magazine, Nazarbaev’s daughter, Dinara, and her husband, Timur Kulibaev, are among the world’s billionaires.

In 2007, Kulibaev bought a private residence from a member of the British royal family for 15 million pounds, about 25 percent more than the market price of the property, according to Britain’s «Daily Telegraph.» The Kazakh newspaper «Republic» has reported that Dinara paid nearly 75 million Swiss francs earlier this year for a country house near Lake Geneva.

Nazarbaev’s former son-in-law, Rakhat Aliev, amassed a great fortune before falling out of favor with his benefactor. Living now in Austria, Aliev has been sentenced in absentia to 40 years in prison by an Almaty court and has had his extensive properties in the country seized — factories, newspapers, aircraft, homes…

For his part, Aliev has penned a tell-all about Nazarbaev called «The Godfather,» in which he writes that Nazarbaev has three wives and plans to hand over power to a son by his third wife who is now just five years old.

Turkmenistan also has a reputation for corruption and nepotism. Former Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov’s son, Murat, was given a privileged access to the business world. He was entrusted with control over exports of the country’s natural gas. Some media reported that the revenues were held in offshore banks in Cyprus. Murat was suspected of accepting bribes from foreign companies interested in drilling and extracting the gas. He also controlled earnings from the lucrative sale of alcohol and cigarettes.

In the three years since the death of «President-For-Life» Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s government has taken some steps to dismantle the corrupt Niyazov system. However, we now see the rise of the family and inner circle of President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. Former dentist Berdymukhammedov used to drive an old Russian car, but has lately developed a taste for luxury. One of his daughters lives in London, another in Paris. He has been steadily installing his friends and fellow clan members in powerful state positions.

None of these leaders seems to have learned anything from the experience of Kyrgyzstan. They continue to ignore the simple truth that one day, inevitably, the patience of the people will simply run out.

Cholpon Orozobekova is a Kyrgyz journalist based in Geneva. She has worked for BBC radio, RFE/RL, IWPR, and as editor in chief of independent newspaper «De Facto.» The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

Cholpon Orozobekova, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/deep_roots_of_nepotism_in_central_asia/2249061.html

Farhod Hasanov has never heard of e-mail, or Facebook, or other social-networking tools teenagers in other parts of the world take for granted in this digital age.

The 17-year-old Tajik student does know what it takes to feed a family of five, however.

«I help my father cutting wood, collecting fodder for our cattle, and harvesting apricots in our backyard, because we need them all during the winter season,» Hasanov says. «If you buy them from the bazaar, it will cost a lot of money and then you would have to cut back on other things, like clothes.»

Farhod lives in the village of Tagisada in Tajikistan’s northern Isfara district, a remote village where most locals make a living by farming or working in Russia as migrant laborers.

To connect to the Internet or watch a movie at a cinema, Farhod would have to take a bus 30 kilometers to the nearest town, Isfara. But Farhod, speaking with a group of friends outside a former madrasah (Islamic religious school) in his village, says he can’t afford such hobbies.

Farhod and many of his friends used to study at the madrasah, but the authorities closed the madrasah down a few years ago amid rumors that some of its students had joined extremist groups in Afghanistan.

The move came amid growing concerns in Tajikistan that some extremist groups were seeking to take advantage of the rising influence of Islam to recruit supporters, especially among the young Tajiks. Islam is rapidly on the rise in Tajikistan, and observers note that Tajikistan’s younger generation is far more religious than their parents, who were brought up during the Soviet era.

Aside from registered religious schools like Farhod’s, the authorities have also closed down several unregistered madrasahs in recent years. A number of mosques have been raided amid suspicions that their imams were conducting unsanctioned religious lessons for children. Some imams, especially graduates of foreign madrasahs, have been accused of using mosque sermons to promote radical agendas of unsanctioned groups, such as Salafiya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

‘No Place to Socialize’

«I go to mosque because I meet other young people there,» says Farhod, who regularly attends prayers along with most of his friends — a practice they say they began at the age of six or seven.

«I don’t have anywhere else to hang out,» he explains. «Our village doesn’t have a sports center. We don’t have any stadium, or a youth club.»

Farhod and his friends say they have never been to a concert, a movie, or a sports competition, because «such things don’t exist in villages.»

It is a common problem all over the country, where some 70 percent of the population live in rural communities. Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, Tajikistan’s former religious leader and a former deputy prime minister, says that because of the lack of alternatives «mosques have become almost the only place where villagers can socialize.»

«Mosques everywhere in Tajikistan usually have two rooms or halls — one is a prayer hall, and another room is used by villagers as a place for socializing,» Turajonzoda says. «After the prayers, older people go home, but young people stay until the midnight and even early hours to mingle, eat, or even play cards.»
Like any teenager, Farhod dreams of a better future. He says he wants to become a successful businessman or to work in a bank but is not sure if his dreams will ever materialize.

«I think I will have to go to Russia as a laborer after I finish my school next summer,» Farhod says. «I heard you have to pay bribes to get a good job or enter universities, but our family doesn’t have money for that. And I see that many people in our neighborhood go to Russia even after they graduate from universities, because they can’t find jobs.»

«There are good jobs in cities, but you need to have a good knowledge of English and computers to get them,» adds 17-year-old Amonullo Haitov, one of Farhod’s friends.

Unemployment is indeed one of the key social problems in the impoverished country, where some 60 percent of the population lives below the official poverty line. Official unemployment figures stand at 2.2 percent, but according to local experts, the real number is above 35 percent.

Future Doubts

Farhod and his friends’ lack of faith in the future is a sentiment shared by many young people in Tajikistan.

Tajik experts, especially those dealing with youth issues, say young people’s frustration with the lack of opportunities is alarming.

With some 60 percent of Tajikistan’s population of 7 million under the age of 25, the country simply can’t afford not to tackle their major problem, says Qiyomiddin Avazov, head of the youth committee of the Islamic Renaissance Party.

«Unemployment among the youth could contribute to much bigger problems in the country, including to extremism, especially when young people find themselves in a hopeless situation,» Avazov says.

«In addition to unemployment and poverty, they face a lack of political freedom,» he adds, «which doesn’t help the situation.»

«When a person is left unemployed, he becomes capable of many things; he can cause many troubles,» Avazov says. «It is true especially when the situation in the country is already volatile. Extremist elements try to target such disillusioned people.»

Tackling Unemployment?

The State Committee for Youth Affairs acknowledges the growing problem. The committee sets up job fairs every three months in major cities. It also assists some young people in finding legal employment outside the country, such as seasonal job contracts in construction and agricultural firms in Russia.

The committee has provided money for a number of athletes to travel abroad to take part in sports competitions. It also gives small grants to nongovernmental organizations that offer projects to create jobs for young people.

There are also a number of NGOs in the country — such as the Youth Development Fund in the northern city of Khujand and the Noor society in the eastern town of Shugnon — that offer free classes in English and computer basics, among others.

Unfortunately, NGOs suffer from a lack of funds, limiting the number of young people they can reach. And government job fairs usually offer a limited number of positions, which often pay meager wages.

Avazov says more needs to be done and quickly. «There are many other ways to create jobs, such as opening small and medium businesses, setting up smaller-scale factories,» he says.

Bringing Students Home

The government has recently called home some 1,500 young men studying in madrasahs in countries like Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan. The country’s top officials, including President Emomali Rahmon, have cited the risks of the students becoming «terrorists and extremists» under the influence of certain foreign groups.

Some parents of returning students are concerned about the future of their children. They had hoped that, upon return, the government would help their children find alternative places to study or work at home.

Farhod says he doesn’t want to study in foreign madrasahs but he would not mind «traveling abroad some day.»

«I watch American movies and music video clips on DVDs and want to see where they were filmed,» Farhod says. «My favorite singer is Enrique [Iglesias].»

Farhod listens to Enrique’s songs on the radio and compact disks. Digital music players haven’t reached his village yet.

Farangis Najibullah, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_poverty_extremism_islam/2242717.html

Tajikistan is losing the battle against the flow of drugs from neighbouring Afghanistan and is characterised by «cronyism and corruption» emanating from the president downwards.
A series of leaked US diplomatic dispatches released by WikiLeaks paint a bleak picture of Central Asia’s poorest state. They note that it suffers from «earthquakes, floods, droughts, locusts and extreme weather» and is situated next to «obstructive Uzbekistan», «unstable Afghanistan» and the «rough, remote» Pamir mountains next to western China.
But Tajikistan’s worst obstacle is the country’s venal president Emomali Rahmon, diplomats say. A secret cable dated 16 February 2010, from the US embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital, describes how Rahmon runs the ex-Soviet republic’s economy for his own personal profit: «From the president down to the policeman on the street, government is characterized by cronyism and corruption.»
«Rahmon and his family control the country’s major businesses, including the largest bank, and they play hardball to protect their business interests, no matter the cost to the economy writ large. As one foreign ambassador summed up, President Rahmon prefers to control 90% of a ten-dollar pie, rather than 30% of a hundred-dollar pie.»
Tajikistan’s sole industrial exports are aluminium and hydroelectricity. But most of the revenues from the «technically state-owned Tajik Aluminium Company (Talco) end up in a secretive offshore company controlled by the president,» the cable states, adding dolefully: «The state budget sees little of the income.»
Tajikistan is of growing importance to the US as a military supply route for the US army in next-door Afghanistan. But attempts to stop the endless traffic of Afghan heroin in the other direction, to Europe and to Russia, have so far come to nothing, the cables say. Last year Dushanbe intercepted only 5% of the 40 tonnes of «Afghan opiates» smuggled to Russia, the cable says, noting: «Corruption is a major problem.» In addition, Tajikistan’s «largely conscript» border guards are «poorly trained, poorly paid, under-equipped and often under-fed».
In an entertaining cable the US ambassador in Tajikistan Richard E Hoagland describes a meeting with President Rahmon soon after he kicked the Russians out. Rahmon explained that Moscow had been using the border guards to orchestrate a coup against him.
Chucking away his notes, the president said the Russian special services were bent on «causing trouble in Tajikistan». «It’s coming from the Kremlin, and some of it comes from the top. We can never forget that Putin himself is a ‘chekist’ (career intelligence officer) at heart,» the president said.
During the two-and-a-half hour meeting, the president expressed gratitude to the US, arguing that it was important for the «international community to moderate what he described as Russia’s ‘worst instincts’.» The cables also reveal that Tajikistan agreed to host a US military base on its territory – in defiance of the Kremlin, which regards former Soviet central Asia as a zone of «privileged interest» and is determined to keep Washington out.
The US appears under no illusions about the Kremlin’s resistance to US encroachment in its back yard. «We believe Russia is exerting consistent and strong pressure on Tajikistan to reduce the US and western role and presence,» the embassy said in 2006.
America’s own attempts to make friends with the Russians in Tajikistan were often crudely rebuffed, the cables show. In November 2006 the US ambassador hosted a dinner. The Russian ambassador and his deputy failed to turn up, however, and the defence attache, Colonel Ivanov, left after just 10 minutes.
The one colonel who stayed, Alexei Zavizyan, «was mildly rude throughout the evening,» the ambassador recalled. His behaviour «deteriorated rapidly after Colonel Ivanov’s departure. Zavizyan made a series of sexist remarks. The dinner ended abruptly after he sunk to uttering racist slurs about African Americans».

Luke Harding, Guardian

Источник: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/12/wikileaks-bleak-picture-tajikistan

It must be a tradition left from the Soviet-era that Tajiks still love reading newspapers.

People buy newspapers from kiosks as well as from vendors who sell random newspapers and magazines on the street.

The choice of newspapers, however, is getting smaller and smaller. Three independent publications «Faraj,» «Paikon,» and «Nigoh» were closed down by authorities last month.

They remain shut despite pleas and protests by local media groups, international organizations, and the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe.

Fearing a similar fate, other publications have reduced themselves to reporting on harmless topics.

The country’s television and radio stations also largely avoid politics, or any topic that could anger authorities. Media criticism of the country’s president in any shape or form is simply out of the question.

While the ongoing military operation in Tajikistan’s eastern Rasht Valley has been widely discussed in regional media, for the most part, Tajik television and publications avoid discussing it.

«If it wasn’t for Russian-language media, I wouldn’t even hear that something had happened in Rasht or Isfara,» says Nurullo Nurulloev, a resident of the northern city of Khujand.

«From Tajik television and media, I can tell you what’s going on in Haiti or Chili, but they don’t mention what’s really happening at home.»

It seems only state newspapers and tabloids can survive in Tajikistan’s political climate.

Farangis Najibullah RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/Tajik_Diary_What_Not_to_Cover/2222682.html

Already denounced in the 2009 edition of the World Press Freedom Index, the often liberticidal legislative activity of certain European Union Member States, and the new upsurge in anti-press proceedings brought by political leaders, are weakening the European freedom of expression model and, in so doing, are undermining its external policy and the universal impact of its values.

Ireland is still punishing blasphemy with a EUR 25,000 fine. Romania now considers the media a threat to national security and plans to legally censor its activities. In Italy, where ten or so journalists still live under police protection, only an unprecedented national media mobilisation’s tenacity helped to defeat a bill aimed at prohibiting the publication of the content of telephone call intercepts, one of the main sources used in judicial and investigative journalism. Although the United Kingdom still benefits from a free and high-quality media, its defamation laws offer grounds for assembly-line trials brought by censors of every sort. Not only would this be counter-productive, but all such actions would complicate the mission of those who, outside of the EU, are trying to secure the decriminalisation of press offences.

The heads of European governments, like their parliamentary colleagues, are gaining notoriety for their increasingly systematic use of proceedings against the news media and its journalists. The latter have to endure the insults which political leaders allow themselves to indulge in ever more frequently in their statements, following, in such matters, the deplorable example of press freedom predators, and overlooking the moral obligations inherent in their public office.

In Slovenia, the former Prime Minister is thus competing with Silvio Berlusconi and Robert Fico by demanding no less than 1.5 million euros from a journalist who denounced irregularities tainting certain procurement contracts. In France, the presidential majority could not find words harsh enough to label journalists who inquired into the Woerth/Bettencourt affair. But the prize for political meddling goes to the Greek government which, in a manner not unlike most of the government censors, went so far as to request its German counterpart to apologise for the Greek economic crisis headline used by the magazine Stern.

Among the EU-27 countries whose rankings declined the most, Bulgaria continues its slide and has ended up, along with Greece, in 70th place – the worst position held by EU member countries. France (44th) and Italy (49th), still dealing with some major interference in media activity by their political leaders, confirmed their status as the “dunces” of the EU’s founding countries. Although we may welcome with cautious relief the ebbing ETA attacks against the media in Spain (39th), we cannot help but be concerned by the court verdict of 21 months in prison and the prohibition to exercise their profession brought against Daniel Anido, director of the private radio station Cadena SER, and Rodolfo Irago, the news director of the same radio network.

In Denmark (11th) as well as Sweden (1st), press freedom is faring well, but murder attempts against cartoonists Kurt Westergaard and Lars Vilks are opening a door to self-censorship, which until now had been negligible, in a climate of rising extremism and nationalism. Slovakia (35th), which is just emerging from former Prime Minister Robert Fico’s tumultuous era, now merits watching, while among the Baltic States, Latvia (30th) is experiencing an odd return to violence and censorship in an electoral period.

Although weakened, the European Union remains one of the rare areas in which the media can exist under acceptable conditions. Naturally, constant vigilance is needed to ensure that this weakening can be freely fought. The European Parliament, though legitimately very active internationally in such issues, has shown the full limits of its exercise of power in refusing, by one vote, in plenary session, to address the subject of press freedom in Italy.

The Balkan Peninsula is still a concern and has recorded major changes. Montenegro (-27), Macedonia (-34), Serbia (-23) and Kosovo (-17) constitute the most substantial losses. Although the legislative reforms required for accession to the EU have been adopted in most Balkan countries, their implementation is still in the embryonic – if not non-existent – stage.

Control of the public and private media by the calculated use of institutional advertising budgets and the collusion between political and judicial circles is making the work of journalists increasingly difficult. In a precarious situation, caught in a vice between the violence of ultranationalist groups and authorities who have not yet rid themselves of old reflexes from the Communist era, an increasing portion of journalists are settling for a calculated self-censorship or a mercenary journalism which pays better, but gradually ruins the profession’s credibility. Blighted by mafioso activities which, every year, strengthen their financial stranglehold on the media sector, independent publications are waging an ongoing battle which deserves more sustained attention from European neighbours.

At Europe’s doors, Turkey and Ukraine are experiencing historically low rankings, the former (138th) being separated from Russia’s position (140th) only by Ethiopia (139th). These declines can be explained, as far as Turkey is concerned, by the frenzied proliferation of lawsuits, incarcerations, and court sentencing targeting journalists. Among them, there are many media outlets and professionals which are either Kurd or are covering the Kurd issue. Ukraine is paying the price of the multiple press freedom violations which have broadsided the country since February 2010 and Viktor Yanukovych’s election as Head of State. These violations initially met with indifference by the local authorities. Worse still, censorship has signalled its return, particularly in the audiovisual sector, and serious conflicts of interest are menacing Ukraine’s media pluralism.

Russia now occupies a position (140th) more like it had in previous years, with the exception of 2009, which was marred by the murder of several journalists and human rights activists. Nonetheless, the country has recorded no improvement. The system remains as tightly controlled as ever, and impunity reigns unchallenged in cases of violence against journalists.

Central Asia’s prospects are dismal. In addition to Turkmenistan, which – in the 176th place – is still one of the worst governments in the world in terms of freedom (only the state-owned media is tolerated there and even that is often “purged”), Kazakhstan (162nd) and Kyrgyzstan (159th) are ranked dangerously close to Uzbekistan, holding steady in the 163rd position.

Almaty has gained notoriety through repeated attacks on the rights of the media and journalists in the very year in which he presides over the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), when the country is bound to be subjected to particularly close scrutiny. Despite repeated calls for remedying problems of all kinds which are hampering media activity, authorities have not deemed it necessary to do so, nor to release Ramazan Eserguepov, detained in prison for political reasons. Kazakhstan’s neighbouring country, Kyrgyzstan joined this descent into the depths of the Index, to the discredit of April’s change of power and June’s inter-ethnic conflicts. As for Uzbekistan, the core of independent journalists who refuse to give up is now in the judicial authorities’ line of fire. Documentary film-makers, like trusted journalists, have also been victims of the regime’s paranoia.

All of these developments have only been met with indifference on the part of the European States, too concerned about energy security to protest scandalous practices which violate every international commitment made by Central Asian governments.

Lastly, the situation is dreary and stable in Belarus, torn between two allegiances – one to Moscow and the other to the EU – and caught up in a delicate balancing act between these two powers. The regime makes no concession to civil society and continues, as the December presidential elections approach, to put pressure on the country’s few remaining independent media outlets.

RSF

Источник: http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_EUROPE_GB.pdf

When it comes to education, Tajik officials are willing to cite statistics, no mater how dire. Indeed, the education sector is one of Tajikistan’s few trouble spots that President Imomali Rahmon discusses openly.

“Along with all our achievements [in education], there are lots of problems, mainly the lack of professionals,” Rahmon said at a school opening in September, the state news agency reported.

The commencement of the academic year saw 3,780 schools welcome roughly 1.6 million school-age children. Included in those figures were 184 new schools capable of educating 35,000 students, local media outlets reported. That’s a substantial achievement for a country as economically hard-pressed [4] as Tajikistan. But the education sector is still struggling to keep pace with the expanding number of students. More serious than the lagging pace of school construction is a shortage of qualified teachers.

At least 10,000 of the country’s teachers lack basic qualifications, such as a university degree, Education Ministry officials admit. Most schools operate in shifts, with students only attending a few hours of classes a day. And in rural areas, high school students now teach grade-schoolers.
Given Tajikistan’s high birthrate, the teacher shortage is set to intensify. According to Save the Children, 35 percent of Tajikistan’s population is under age 15. Though the government boasts of a 98 percent literacy rate – thanks to universal education during the Soviet era – experts say that number is in freefall.

Most teachers are leaving the profession not because they have lost their desire to instruct, but because they cannot afford it. According to government figures, the average monthly salary in Tajikistan is 309 Somoni (about $70). Teachers, among the lowest paid professionals, earn around $56 monthly. Most say it is impossible to live on such a wage and many seek second jobs, or leave their positions to search for work abroad.

“A lot of people with a higher education do not want to work in schools because of the low salary and the low [social] status afforded to the teachers’ profession. They don’t want to work in schools and instead find other jobs,” said Zulobi Mamadfozilov, education program manager at the Aga Khan Foundation. “Only those people who don’t have any other options work as teachers.”

The pay issue affects the whole system [5] – “from village schools up to the Ministry of Education,” Mamadfozilov told EurasiaNet.org.

Teaching standards are quickly “falling behind,” says Nodira Rakhmonberdyeva, director of the Manizha Information-Educational Center in Dushanbe. “Under the Soviet system, every single teacher during his or her entire career had to regularly attend training courses. The Ministry of Education controlled teachers’ proper application of traditional and newly adopted teaching methodologies. Every once in a while teachers had to pass qualification exams to remain in compliance with tough professional requirements,” Rakhmonberdyeva explained. Now the government lacks the resources to properly check teachers’ qualifications, Rakhmonberdyeva added.

According to the Tajik Constitution, general education is free and the first nine years are compulsory. But in reality, parents these days pay a de facto tuition that can get expensive. Many schools collect funds for refurbishment, equipment and teachers’ salaries. These “voluntary donations” vary from one school to the next, but many parents complain they are unable to afford the fees. Failure to pay can mean stigmatization or even expulsion. In some cases, experts say, the imposition of fees discourage parents from sending their children to school at all.

The downward trend for Tajikistan’s educational system started with the devastating civil war [6] in the 1990s that, according to UN statistics, left tens of thousands dead and forced more than 700,000 to flee, roughly one-tenth of the overall population. Tajikistan hasn’t yet recovered from the trauma.

“Deterioration in the nation’s education began right after the collapse of the USSR,” says Roza Umarova, a retired teacher of more than 30 years. “My granddaughter attends a relatively good school in downtown Dushanbe. It still has a good reputation, but the current state of teaching here hardly resembles that in the late 1980s. Students spend limited number of hours in school – many subjects are lacking because of the teacher shortage. However, the school administration consistently collects money from parents, explaining that without these “voluntary donations,” the school would hardly survive at all.”

President Rakhmon declared 2010 “The Year of Education and Technical Knowledge.” But the moniker means little if the state cannot attract teachers and the parents cannot afford to send their children to school.

Editor’s note:
Konstantin Parshin is a freelance writer based in Tajikistan

Konstantin Parshin, EurasiaNet

Источник: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62222