Schools have been closed for the summer holidays, but learning hasn’t stopped for many children in the eastern Tajik valley of Rasht, a picturesque and remote mountainous area once known as a bastion of the country’s Islamic opposition.

It seems to be a growing trend in the Rasht Valley that parents send their children to local mullahs to get what they consider basic religious education and ethics.

Such classes are not sanctioned and their curriculum is not checked or verified by education authorities.

According to children who attend these informal classes, mullahs teach them the Arabic alphabet and basic knowledge of Islam along with moral principles, such as respecting parents. Some mullahs even use Farsi-Tajik classic literature masterpieces, notably the medieval-period poets Saadi and Hafez’s works for teaching moral principles for children.
One Rasht parent, Hikoyat Dodarkhojaeva, says her two sons’ behavior has improved significantly since they started learning religious values and ethnics from their local mullah. They have become more obedient and respectful, the mother says proudly.

Parents in Rasht complain that public schools don’t teach children the moral codes, family values, and religious principles they reckon are «very important» for children’s upbringing.

Tajikistan has outlawed unsanctioned madrasahs along with unregistered mosques. Mullahs in Rasht, too, have been banned from running religious classes.

Rasht is considered to be one of the most religious and conservative areas in the predominantly Muslim country. It was a stronghold of the Islamic opposition forces that fought against President Emomali Rahmon’s secular government during the five-year civil war in the 1990s.

The government in Dushanbe has brought the valley under its full control but some small-scale skirmishes — linked to former opposition elements — still take place in the area from time to time.

It is a widespread belief that many local residents in Rasht still treat the central government with suspicion.

Rasht residents, however, do not link their children’s religious education classes to being conservative or overly religious.

And parents don’t call these de facto classes «schooling» or «madrasah.» For them it’s merely «spending a few hours with a respectful mullah to learn moral values.»

Farangis Najibullah, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/Lessons_In_Morality_In_Eastern_Tajikistan_/2104200.html

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has said it would send a 52-member police force to southern Kyrgyzstan.

Herbert Salber, director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, told reporters on July 16 the pan-European security bloc and Kyrgyzstan have agreed to dispatch the group to the regions of Osh and Jalal-Abad.

He was speaking during an informal meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, ahead of the July 17 meeting of foreign ministers from the 56-member OSCE.

The gathering in Almaty is focused on what is happening across the border in Kyrgyzstan, where violence erupted in the country’s south in June.

Salber said that the group would comprise «52 policemen representing the OSCE member states,» and an OSCE statement added that 50 more officers could later be sent. Salber gave no precise time frame for any possible mission, but the press release said the advisory group would spend four months in Kyrgyzstan.

The advisory group still requires unanimous approval, which could come when the ministers and other officials gather on July 17.

Bloody Ethnic Clashes

Clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions left at least 309 dead and displaced another 400,000.

With Kyrgyz officials estimating that some 2,500 homes, more than 100 commercial buildings, and 10 government buildings were destroyed or suffered major damage during the unrest, the situation remains volatile.

Ahead of the meeting, two foreign ministers were visiting Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest city, to assess the situation for themselves.

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner are flying into the city as part of a fact-finding tour that will also take them to Bishkek, where they will meet with President Roza Otunbaeva.

The OSCE meeting — taking place at the Ak-Bulak resort outside Almaty — comes amid a rising chorus of voices calling on the organization to take a more active role in helping stabilize the country.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s special envoy for Central Asia had urged the organization to send international police to Kyrgyzstan to provide technical advice to local security forces.

Kimmo Kiljunen told reporters last month that he thought the presence of international police advisers could «create an atmosphere of trust» that could help ease tensions. He added that he was recommending a force that would not include «peacekeepers in the military terms» but rather be «an international police operation to offer technical advice.»

Kiljunen also said EU foreign ministers have discussed the option of sending police to provide crisis-management support. However, the European Union itself has yet to indicate it has any plans to do so.

The Kyrgyz government has joined the call for an international police presence, with Otunbaeva saying hours before the gathering that such a mission is needed for maintaining security in Osh.

«These [international police] forces will work temporarily, within a limited period of four months here,» Otunbaeva said. «We are going to reconstruct the city [of Osh]. For instance, they are needed for maintaining security in the city of Osh. They will be unarmed.»

International Inquiry Needed

In addition to an international police force, there are also expectations that the OSCE will lead an international investigation into the June events.

Otunbaeva on July 16 agreed to a proposal that an international commission, to be headed by Kiljunen, be formed to look into the unrest. The commission would include representatives of the OSCE, EU, and the UN, and Otunbaeva said it should work closely with the Kyrgyz investigative commission.

During a joint news conference with Westerwelle in Osh, French Foreign Minister Kouchner said, «We would like to know who these groups are that provoked these incidents. These incidents and animosities go back a long way, but there were clearly provocations in this case and we want to know about them. So we support this proposal for an international investigative commission.»

Ole Solvang, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, told RFE/RL from Bishkek that the Kyrgyz government and the OSCE have discussed the subject in the run-up to the Almaty conference.

«We do know that there have been discussions going on, there have been discussions between the government and the OSCE about an international police force,» Solvang says,» and there have also been discussions between the Kyrgyz government and various actors about an international investigation and it is very much our hope that the OSCE meeting in Almaty this weekend will take that discussion forward.»

Security Questions

Human Rights Watch earlier this month issued a call for the OSCE to send police forces and open an international investigation. The group reported on July 14 widespread cases of torture and arbitrary detentions in southern Kyrgyzstan of Uzbeks suspected of participation in the June violence.

If the OSCE ministers and high representatives discuss the calls for a police mission and an international investigation, a major question would be how to balance the organization’s interests with those of the region’s own multinational security grouping, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The CSTO, which is led by Russia and includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is already sending equipment and funds to Bishkek to bolster the capabilities of Kyrgyz security forces. The CSTO has so far resisted sending any international police forces, despite early calls from Bishkek to do so.

This weekend’s OSCE meeting is also expected to discuss topics ranging from European security to engagement with Afghanistan and possible topics for an OSCE summit.

Kazakhstan, which currently heads the OSCE, has said it hopes to host a formal summit of the organization this year. The group’s last major summit was in Istanbul in 1999.

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/OSCE_Foreign_Ministers_Meet_In_Almaty_On_Kyrgyzstan/2101664.html

Imagine relatives of yours were killed by angry mobs. Your house set alight. Your livelihood wrecked overnight. Knowing that such atrocities took place in the city you called home, and possibly even committed by your neighbors, how could you ever expect to return to life as normal?

It’s a question that is surely being asked by thousands of displaced persons as they return home following the outbreak of bloody interethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June. As the government vows to rebuild the homes and communities of ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz caught up in violence that left at least 275 dead and some 400,000 displaced, it must also find ways to reduce tensions and ensure they don’t erupt again in the future.

Millions Displaced

If the Kyrgyz interim government is looking for an immediate example of how to get the mending process going, it need not look any farther than its southern neighbor, Tajikistan. In 1997, following the end of a five-year civil war, Tajikistan faced a similar test. And while there have been many setbacks, 13 years later Tajikistan’s peace process has been widely hailed as a success.

It’s not a perfect comparison. The Tajik war did not rise from ethnic divisions such as those seen recently in Kyrgyzstan, for example — it was more a battle for political control fought between supporters of the Moscow-backed government in Dushanbe and its opposition led by the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). But the Tajik war did pit fellow civilians against each other — residents of the southern Kulob region, «Kulobis,» against those from the eastern Rasht Valley known as «Rashtis.»

In a conflict in which Kulobis were widely assumed to be government supporters, and Rashtis supporters of the opposition, at least 50,000 people were killed. Most of the victims were civilians, and 1.2 million — some 20 percent of the country’s population at the time — were forced to leave their homes during the 1992-97 armed conflict.

For Suliko Salimova, a 50-year-old from a small village in southern Tajikistan near the Kulob region, the civil war conjures up painful memories.

«I left my house with only the clothes I was wearing. When I came back, I learned that my husband had killed and my house was burned down. I was left with absolutely nothing,» Salimova says.

«When everybody else fled, my husband stayed behind. He said, ‘I don’t belong to any side of the conflict, why would they bother me?’ But he was the first one to be killed. We found his body in a nearby brook.»

Salimova lost four other relatives in addition to her husband, all targeted for being Rashtis. «My life will never be the same again after what I witnessed during civil war,» she laments.

Gulrukhsor Safarova, a native of the Kulob region, has similarly painful memories.

«I saw many bodies [of Kulobis] being brought for burial. When you see them first-hand, you can’t help hating those who did it. I didn’t know who had done it, all I knew was that somebody was killing Kulobis. I remember having some strange feelings inside me,» Safarova says.

Today the two women have each managed to achieve forgiveness, and even reside in the same district of Kumsangir, in the southern Khatlon Province.

Salimova says people need to reconcile, «no matter how painful it is,» in order to move on. Safarova, recalling that she was eyed with suspicion when she first moved to the area at the height of the civil war, is happy to see Rashtis and Kulobis socializing together once again.

Money And Time

Such results were not easy to achieve, and they did not come about by accident. It required cooperation between the Tajik government, the opposition, and international organizations. It took money. And it took time.

The process began with the signing of an internationally mediated peace accord between the government and the United Tajik Opposition in June 1997.

But «signing a peace accord by itself does not mean people immediately start trusting each other,» as Ibrohim Usmonov notes. «And you cannot give people an instruction to do so.»

Usmonov knows this first-hand. He was a prominent member of the key body established by the government and opposition to facilitate the road to peace and harmony — the National Reconciliation Commission.

Recalling the many obstacles faced, Usmonov says «the biggest challenge was rebuilding trust between the two sides.» And this, he says, «required concrete measures by government, political leaders, and international donors.»

Measures included aiding the return of refugees and the displaced, rebuilding their homes, restoring their businesses, and reinstating returnees to their previous jobs.

«There was a rehabilitation program for victims of the conflict, which included psychological and financial support for those who had lost their relatives and properties,» Usmonov says, noting that funding from international donors enabled Tajikistan to implement its peace program.

Usmonov points out that the government’s role is crucial for building trust among people. «People need to see for themselves that the peace process is working and the government’s promises are being carried out,» he says.

Kumsangir district provides proof that today enough trust has been established for people to resume their normal lives.

Suliko Salimova, whose husband was killed for being a Rashti, has moved to Kumsangir, remarried, and become a merchant.

Safarova, who moved to Kumsangir from Kulob, who has since got a job with the local government dealing with women and family issues. «A few marriages between Kulobis and Rashtis have taken place in our district in recent years,» Safarova says.

The two women admit there are times people snap at neighbors, blaming them for what has happened during the war. But as Salimova notes, «no one wants another war or conflict to grip our lives once again.»

Ultimately, the success in restoring peace and unity in Tajikistan derives from «ordinary people’s willpower and ability to forgive,» according to Hikmatulloh Saifullozoda, head of the Dushanbe-based think tank Dialog and member of the Islamic Renaissance Party who was active in the National Reconciliation Commission.

«People knew that revenge wasn’t a solution,» Saifullozoda says. «People knew revenge would bring more violence, more bloodshed, so they made the only right choice, and that choice was peace.»

RFE/RL’s Tajik Service correspondent in Khatlon Nosirjon Mamurzoda contributed to this report

Farangis Najibullah, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/A_Tajik_Peace_Recipe_For_Kyrgyzstan/2096637.html

BRUSSELS — The top EU envoy for Central Asia has warned that recent instability in the south of Kyrgyzstan could spill over into other countries along the Ferghana Valley.

Pierre Morel, the EU special representative for the region, also said the EU wants the referendum on Kyrgyzstan’s new constitution to go ahead as planned on June 27.

Morel made his comments before the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee in Brussels today.

The hour-long question-and-answer session was the first public appearance of the veteran EU envoy after a fact-finding visit to Kyrgyzstan last week.

His audience consisted of a dozen or so scattered EU deputies struggling to use up their allotted speaking time.
Morel — who said he had left a meeting of EU ambassadors busy «mobilizing resources» for Kyrgyzstan — sought to impress on his listeners the gravity of the situation.

The situation is “difficult, very difficult, because apart from the future of the country, it puts into question the security and stability of the entire Central Asian region,» Morel said.

Regional stability is an important EU policy objective, given Central Asia’s significant energy resources and proximity to Afghanistan.

Morel said there has been too little EU engagement with Kyrgyzstan in the past, despite the country’s attempts to break with authoritarianism. Only France and Germany have embassies in Bishkek, and an EU delegation was established only in February.

Blame Placed On Bakiev

The EU envoy blamed the «clan» of ex-President Kurmanbek Bakiev, ousted in April after a popular revolt, for fomenting the unrest in Kyrgyzstan’s south earlier this month which saw scores of people killed in clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

Morel said Bakiev’s loyalists, led by his brother, made a «concerted effort» to provoke the clashes in a bid to regain power. Bakiev, who is now in Belarus, has denied any connection to the violence.

Morel said that during his trip he spoke to civil society activists who had been on the ground in Osh during the turmoil.

He also noted the presence of drug gangs and Islamic extremists in the southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad.

Another factor, Morel said, was the «lack of attention and effort» from Bishkek, and the inadequacies of the local law enforcement forces, which were overrun, with many police killed.

The EU diplomat said the bloc is now looking for a «role» in the country alongside the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), without «duplicating» the work of either.

Morel said the EU’s focus is on fostering democracy in Kyrgyzstan. «The message of the European Union is very clear. We call for a road map for a return to democracy. First, public order; second, the rule of law: and, third, a return to a genuinely democratic constitution,» he said.

Morel said the EU wants the June 27 referendum on a new constitution to go ahead.

He noted the constitution — with elections to follow in October — will not usher in a fully parliamentary system, but a «mixed» one where a popularly elected president still has wide powers.

But, Morel said, the elements of parliamentarianism in the new constitution should «balance» the president’s role and break what he called the «Kyrgyz cycle» of street protests against autocratic rulers being usurped by clan leaders acting in their own narrow self-interest.

The EU has released 5 million euros ($6.14 million) in humanitarian aid, and another 6 million is in the pipeline for electoral support and civil society initiatives.

Ahto Lobjakas, REE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Envoy_Warns_Of_Regional_Risk_From_Kyrgyz_Instability/2080537.html

Tajik authorities have been trying to take control of the cellular communications market, which is divided among eight operator companies, half of them foreign co-owned.
The campaign to regulate cellular provider activities began with President Emomali Rakhmon’s speech in parliament April 30, in which he claimed cell phones are unhealthy and that telecom services cost too much.
By his estimates, keeping one cell phone costs a Tajik family US $11 per month. The average monthly salary is US $80. In 2009, cellular providers earned more than US $320m. Seventy-five percent of the country’s 8m inhabitants own mobile phones, Rakhmon said.
Authorities took down cell phone billboards in Dushanbe May 6, then re-installed most just four days later. Mayoral press spokesman Shavkat Saidov said subordinates misunderstood the mayor’s orders.
“What is at issue is regulation of the advertising market, not tearing down all the billboards”, Saidov said.
Local television networks launched a campaign against cell phone use, which the president called a possible cause of cancer. Rakhmon personally instructed all educational institutions and the local media to transmit his message.
“Each reporter must prepare several stories explaining the hazards of using cellular telephones”, said a state TV journalist, who requested anonymity. “We are supposed to persuade people this is unaffordable luxury at a time of a financial crisis”.
Konstantin Bondarenko, director of the National Association of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses, who has worked in telecom regulation for six years, said neither doctors nor the Transport and Communications Ministry has ever seen any medical research data showing that cellular communications indeed threaten health.
A recently completed ten-year study of 13,000 people by the World Health Organization found no conclusive link between cell phone use and brain cancer. However researchers said there were some problems with the study and that more research needs to be done.
For many, having a cell phone is a necessity. But some feel the Tajik government is now making the phones less efficient.
“When I once called my sick parents and failed to get through to them via the land line, I realised what it means to be left without the telephone”, said Sabrina, a 29-year-old Dushanbe resident.
On May 14, the Transport and Communications Ministry prohibited calls from the stationary home telephones operated by the state company TochikTelecom to clients of the cellular provider TaCom, which provides services under the Beeline trademark.
Communications Deputy Minister Beg Zukhurov pinned the blame on TaCom.
“We found that company breaching existing regulations”, he said. “It unlawfully set up a radio relay station — an antenna receiving and transmitting satellite signals — near the Afghan border”.
TaCom has a licence to operate the relay station, company spokeswoman Marina Roshkina said.
“Our subscribers are now unable to get through to emergency services, police, etc., in case of emergency”, she said. “Unless they have a land line, people may find themselves in a desperate position”.
TaCom has suffered tens of thousands of dollars in losses; if the conflict drags on, the company will have the right to sue, Roshkina said.
Telecom firms operate at the mercy of the government and have no option to take the issue to court, said an employee for a cellular provider on condition of anonymity.
“Earlier this year MLT, which is 75% owned by Megaphone Russia, attempted to re-brand to Megaphone Tajikistan and spent huge sums on advertising but finally was blocked by the Tajik government”, he said.
The newspaper Fakty I Kommentarii, citing local analysts, reported that cellular providers received unofficial suggestions to purchase shares in the Rogun hydropower project worth US $5m-10m, but they declined.
“That’s pure gossip”, said an MLT representative who asked to remain anonymous. “Of course, telecom operators did buy the hydropower project’s shares, but the whole thing most likely boils down to yet another attempt to unite us within a single switching centre (within) the state-run TochikTelecom.”
The government has been seeking to regulate cellular providers, who reported an income of US $320m in 2009 while actually earning over US $1 billion, political scientist Saimuddin Dustov said.
“Quite understandably, the state wishes to take this market under control”, he said. “To do that, it needs a Unified Switching Centre to handle all the cellular operators’ traffic and make sure they have zero opportunity to conceal their earnings. At the same time, its attempts to put the industry in order have been wrongful and aggressive.”
Government policy has only been scaring potential investors away, complained Gafur Irkayev, president of the Telecom Operators’ Association.
“With over 90% of Tajikistan’s territory mountainous, cellular providers have run a loss trying to serve the hard-to-access regions”, he said.
“Cellular communications is a dynamically developing market, and the involvement of ever more players gives the industry an additional boost”, Dustov said. “Over the past two years, our telecom operators have got a firmer foothold in Tajikistan – and this despite what they perceive as growing government pressure. I am positive the government will lose again”.
“Unfortunately, (cellular provider-bashing) policy may be detrimental to the state budget, into which cellular providers have annually paid up to US$100m in taxes”, Irkayev said.

Rukhshona Ibragimova, CentralAsiaOnline.com

Источник: CentralAsiaOnline.com

Kamol Azizov’s daily routine isn’t so different from that of any other villager living in the Ferghana Valley: he walks to work every morning, gets his weekly supplies from a nearby bazaar, and runs errands for his elderly parents, who live just around the corner.

Except, to complete his tasks, Azizov must trek across an international border multiple times. Azizov’s native village, Chashma, is located in the Uzbek enclave of Sokh, which is located inside the southern Kyrgyz province of Batken. What this means for Azizov is that the nearest bazaar is in a foreign land, Kyrgyzstan, as is his parent’s home, while Azizov’s work at the local job center is located in Uzbekistan.

«My house is located less than 300 meters from the Kyrgyz border,” Azizov explains. “There are some houses in our neighborhood — my house is on Sokh territory but its veranda is on Kyrgyz territory. And there are many split families in Chashma. Parents registered as Kyrgyz citizens, their sons and grandchildren as Sokh residents [and thus Uzbek citizens], and their homes are separated by barbed wire. There are Kyrgyz border posts everywhere and it’s very difficult to move around.»

Like other Sokh residents, Azizov has become accustomed to carrying his passport at all times. «Being stopped and searched at Kyrgyz checkpoints has become a part of our everyday lives,» says Azizov.

Recent tensions between Sokh residents and their Kyrgyz neighbors over the right to graze their animals on local pastures have further complicated an already-complex cultural and political situation.

Kyrgyzstan last month stopped allowing Sokh residents to graze their livestock on Kyrgyz pastureland, affecting many Sokh households’ livelihoods. With pastures no longer available, having to keep their sheep, goats, and cattle penned up inside barns poses tremendous difficulties for the villagers.

Some Sokh residents reportedly responded by attacking Kyrgyz cars passing through the Uzbek enclave territory. Their Kyrgyz neighbors, in return, blocked the main highway connecting the enclave with rest of Uzbekistan, and demanded protection.

Pacifying Measures

Officials from the both sides met on June 1 to discuss the rising tensions in the area as well as other longstanding disagreements over the enclave, and managed to sign an agreement.

To ease the tension between the two countries, Uzbekistan began to withdraw armored vehicles it stationed in Sokh after a 1999 incursion into southern Kyrgyzstan by Uzbek militants.

The Kyrgyz side has yet to allow Sokh residents to use the pasture land. But Kyrgyz officials agreed to eliminate several checkpoints in the area.

«It’s welcome news,» Azizov says. «When we travel from Sokh to the provincial center, Ferghana, or to the nearest city, Rishton, we have to pass at least five Kyrgyz checkpoints. They stop us, check our passports and cars, and sometimes they keep us for longer. And some of them have a habit of extorting money.”

“And even in my village, Chashma, when we go to the nearby market, which is on the Kyrgyz land, we need to pass a checkpoint, where Kyrgyz soldiers check us and ask for money,» Azizov says.

With 325 square kilometers of mountainous land, Sokh is the largest Uzbek enclave on Kyrgyz territory. To further complicate things, the majority of its some 65,000 citizens are ethnic Tajik.

Altogether there are eight enclaves in the Ferghana Valley, including four Uzbek enclaves inside Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz village of Barak on Uzbek territory. Tajikistan has two enclaves on Kyrgyz territory and the village of Savak inside Uzbekistan.

The enclaves were carved out during the Soviet era based on the main language spoken by the majority of the population living there.

Sokh, however was an exception. No one can explain how an area that had a vast Tajik majority was made an Uzbek enclave. Many people in Ferghana Valley believe the enclave of Sokh has proven to be one of the strangest creations of Soviet-era leaders.

There are 26 schools and four colleges in Sokh’s roughly 20 villages. All the schools and colleges operate in Tajik. So does the local media, including a news and entertainment television channel and the weekly newspaper, «Sadoi Sokh» («Voice of Sokh»).

Politics Felt In The Village

The enclave’s unusual circumstances have made its inhabitants vulnerable to political tensions in all three countries.

«When there are tensions in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan — in Bishkek, or, for instance, in Andijon — Uzbekistan closes its borders and intensifies controls and checks,» says Bolta, a Sokh resident who did not want to give his full name. «When the Uzbek border is closed, it cuts us off too; we can’t enter Uzbekistan easily. Imagine, you need to go to a funeral, or you’re seriously ill and want to visit a city hospital, but you can’t go there because the border is closed, and no one knows when it will reopen.»

The nearest airport or railway station for Sokh residents is some 120 kilometers away in Ferghana city, which is also a provincial center. The nearest Uzbek town is Rishton, 70 kilometers from Sokh.

There are no regular buses or trains connecting Sokh to any other city. Private cars or taxis are the only means of transport, but not everybody can afford to use them.

Further adding to Sokh inhabitants’ isolation is the fact that Uzbekistan closed its borders with Kyrgyzstan following the April riots in Bishkek. Sokh has also suffered from long-standing political disagreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

For many decades, Tajik universities were the main destination for further education for graduates of Sokh’s schools.

With souring relationships between Tashkent and Dushanbe, Uzbek education officials no longer recognize Tajik university degrees. Sokh school graduates were left with no other choice but to enroll in Uzbek universities.

After severing cultural and educational ties with Dushanbe, Sokh libraries no longer receive Tajik-language books and publications from Dushanbe. The district’s main library is almost devoid of any new books.

«But it’s not all bad news,» says Azizov. «Living in an enclave has its positive sides, too. Everyone in Sokh is fluent in three languages — Uzbek and Kyrgyz in addition to our mother tongue, Tajik — without getting language classes.»

«We don’t care about politics, but politics have so much impact on our lives,» says Akramjon, a 41-year-old amateur singer who didn’t want to give his full name.

The realities of every day life are emerging even in Sokh villagers’ traditional folk songs, known as «Yovailo.» «Yovailo» are love songs, sung by young men at wedding parties and other gatherings, as well as during wheat harvests.

In recent years, however, «Yovailo» lyrics have come to include new themes — such as long roads, long waits, and isolation.

In one song, Akramjon sings mournfully about being stuck in the enclave. «I sit on a rock and wait for you in Sokh,” he sings. “It’s a faraway place near the mountains. I would move to Tashkent or Jizzah to be closer to you, but I can’t leave Sokh behind.”

Farangis Najibullah, RFE/RL

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/Uzbek_Kyrgyz_And_Tajik_Lives_Collide_In_An_Enclave/2061404.html

It was a big day for Russian Internet users.

The first Internet domains using the Cyrillic script were launched on May 13 after Russia was officially assigned the .рф (.rf, for «Russian Federation») domain by the global Internet governing body.

Representatives of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) handed Russia its Cyrillic domain administration certificate at an Internet forum that kicked off in Moscow.

The arrival of Cyrillic on the Internet, where Latin characters have long held a monopoly, follows a similar switch last week, when websites in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates began using Arabic script in their web addresses.

ICANN chief executive Rod Beckstrom said the new native-script domains will help make the World Wide Web even more global.

«It’s a very big move. The Internet’s been around roughly for four decades, and this is the first time that domain names are opening up to people’s native tongues and scripts,» Beckstrom says. «So for the many people in the world that speak Cyrillic, or Arabic-based languages or Chinese-based languages, this is very significant, and Russia is a very important part of ICANN, which is a global organization. So we are very excited to see this happening.»

Igor Shchyogolev, Russia’s minister of communications and mass media, was among the top officials who came to the forum to hail what many have already described as a «birth certificate» for Cyrillic Internet domains.

Shchyogolev told the forum that the changes mark the end of the Latin script’s domination of the Internet — although certain challenges remain.

«The wonderful little character @, which is used to write all Internet addresses, does not exist on the Russian keyboard,» Shchyogolev notes. «To type this character, users have to switch their keyboard from Cyrillic to Latin. This is a detail, but it shows that we have so far been oriented toward the Latin script.»

Paving The Way

ICANN approved the use of non-Latin characters in Internet domain names last autumn. According to ICANN, more than half of the world’s 1.6 billion Internet users speak a native language that is not written with the Latin alphabet.

In Russia, only two Cyrillic addresses were launched today: президент.рф and правительство.рф, the web sites of the country’s president and government.

Gradually, more and more web address holders will be able to «Russify» their domains (including the site of RFE/RL’s Russian Service).

Following private companies, media outlets, and political parties, ordinary users will be able to register for domains in Cyrillic starting October 1.

President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, both self-professed Internet buffs, have actively lobbied for the introduction of Cyrillic domains in Russia.

Supporters say the changes will make the Internet more accessible to Russians who feel intimidated by the Latin script. The Cyrillic web addresses, they say, will also help boost web use in the provinces, which still lag far behind big cities in terms of Internet penetration.

More than 30 million Russians are regular Internet users, out of a total population of some 140 million, and the country has the fastest-growing Internet community in Europe.

‘Massive Audience’

Aleksandr Amzin, an Internet expert at the online news agency Lenta.ru, predicts that Cyrillic domains will prove a success.

«The Russian Internet represents a massive audience, an audience that does not necessarily know English or the Latin alphabet, and for whom it is much simpler to write in Russian than in English,» he tells RFE/RL. «For businesses, it’s not a bad thing either.»

But some web users talk of Internet «separatism» and are worried that the changes will create a segregated, hermetic Russian web and undermine the Internet’s global spirit.

Critics fear that the new domains could encourage Russian authorities to follow China’s example and introduce Internet censorship.

Another concern is the likely rise in cyberfraud. Some companies say they will be forced to acquire a .рф sister domain in order to prevent so-called cybersquatters from taking over the Cyrillic domains and harming their business.

«For cybersquatters, this is heaven,» Amzin says. «Russia already had two domain types — .ru and .su, which stands for Soviet Union. Now we have three. Those who want to protect themselves from fraudsters will now have to register at .ru, .su, and .рф.»

Claire Bigg, Radio Liberty

Источник: Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

WASHINGTON — The world’s press became less free in 2009, experiencing another year of setbacks. Among the top offenders were Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Iran, and Russia.

That’s according to a new report by the Washington-based think tank Freedom House, which annually measures print, broadcast, and Internet freedom in 196 countries.

«This year, we found, globally, another year of downturn,» says Christopher Walker, Freedom House’s director of studies. «This was the eighth successive year where overall declines outweighed gains.»

The Freedom House report assigns a numerical ranking to each country based on legal, political, and economic factors, and considers regulations that restrict media content, editorial pressure by the government, intimidation of journalists, and the structure of media ownership.

The findings show that in 2009 only one in six people lived in a country with a free press. That represents a slight decline worldwide compared to the previous year.

Fueling the trend were efforts by repressive or semi-repressive governments to consolidate existing control over the media — from Africa to Central Asia and beyond.

Iran Repression Worsens

Iran, where the press environment has been designated as «not free» since 1982, received its worst rating in the 30-year history of the survey. It was ranked as the 10th most-repressive country for media in the world in 2009, a reflection of the widespread crackdown on journalists after the disputed reelection of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

Dozens of journalists — including editors, reporters, photographers, and bloggers — remain in Iranian jails, some charged with offenses that carry the death penalty. The government has also repeatedly blocked satellite transmissions and restricted Internet and mobile-telephone communication.

In Russia, which is seen as a benchmark for the non-Baltic states of the former Soviet Union, the government maintained its control over nearly all media outlets. The country’s press freedom rating worsened slightly in 2009 and earned a «not free» designation for the seventh straight year. It is now tied with The Gambia in 175th place out of the 196 countries surveyed.

Except for Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, all of which are designated as «free,» and Ukraine and Georgia, both of which are «partly free,» the nine remaining countries of the former Soviet Union join Russia in the «not free» category. That group includes three of the 10 worst offenders on the Freedom House list: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus. In these countries, independent media is «either nonexistent or barely able to operate.»

«Apart from individual journalists being under threat,» Walker says, «we also see the infrastructure of news media coming under the control of governments and the dominant powers [in the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union], such that there isn’t any meaningful pluralism on the news and information that’s relevant.

MOST FREE

1. Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden (tie)
5. Denmark
6. Belgium, Luxembourg (tie)
8. Andorra, Switzerland (tie)
10. Liechtenstein

LEAST FREE

187. Iran
188. Equatorial Guinea
189. Belarus, Uzbekistan (tie)
191. Cuba
192. Eritrea, Libya (tie)
194. Burma, Turkmenistan (tie)
196. North Korea
«Today, one could say in many ways that the globalization that we’ve seen over the past decade has really bypassed the former Soviet Union as it relates to news and information of political relevance.»

Internet Battleground

The press landscape in Russia and in neighboring states was also marred last year by governmental failure to apprehend or prosecute journalists’ attackers — a trend Freedom House observed in countries ranging from Mexico to Afghanistan. The report says failure to bring the perpetrators of such attacks to justice both promotes self-censorship among journalists and encourages new attacks.

Another major trend in 2009 was the continuing emergence of the Internet as a battleground between freedom and state control. While the Internet continues to remain freer than traditional media, last year witnessed new attempts by many of the world’s governments to increase restrictions. Along with well-documented cases of Internet censorship in China and Iran, access was also narrowed in countries such as Kazakhstan, which has drafted legislation to extend state control over online content.

Despite the global decline, some countries did experience greater press freedoms in 2009.

There were fewer attacks on journalists in Ukraine. Armenia and Moldova, while still considered «not free,» registered modest gains as a result of reduced censorship. Iraq, while also remaining in the «not free» group, had an improved rating based on a reduction in deadly violence against journalists and «relatively unbiased» media coverage of elections.

The countries of Scandinavia remain at the top of list, with the greatest levels of press freedom in the world.

written by Richard Solash in Washington, with contributions from Nikola Krastev in New York

RAdio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/Press_Freedom_Suffered_More_Setbacks_In_2009_New_Report_Shows/2027614.h

DUSHANBE — Wednesday, April 28, 2010 — Several non-state, Tajik newspapers are being attacked by influential representatives of Tajikistan’s judicial power.

The attacks, organized by the Tajik Supreme Court, have raised concerns among the country’s media and diplomatic communities.

The attacks concern the demands of two Tajik Supreme Court judges and a Dushanbe city court judge — Nur Nurov, Ulugbek Makhmadshoev and Fakhriddin Dodometov respectively — that three, private, weekly newspapers pay them $1.2 million (5.5 Somoni) for printing comments the judges say have defamed their honor, dignity and business reputations. They are demanding the compensation for “moral damage.”

Specifically, their complaints concern comments made by lawyer Solejon Juraev at a conference late last year during which Juraev is reported to have said that Nurov had violated defendants’ rights and that a verdict in his court was unjust.

The papers, which include Farazh, Ozodagon and Asia Plus, printed Juraev’s comments but say they did not print editorial opinions about them.

The judge’s lawsuits may lead to the closure of the papers and some consider the suits to be a tool for a “financial killing” of the news outlets.

Daily newspapers disappeared in Tajikistan the early 1990s, right after the beginning of the protracted civil war. Ever since, there have been only weekly newspapers, which, time after time, have had a difficult time covering the news as a result of too few financial and human resources.

In recent years, the authorities have also closed down many non-state papers and private printing facilities. Observers have noted that the closures mainly occur on the eve of political elections. The phenomenon has been recorded in detail in numerous reports issued by international security organizations and human rights watchdog groups.

“Such persecutions force editors and journalists to apply tough self-censorship in fear of punishment or closure of their outlets,” Lidia Isamova, a Tajik media expert told Central Asia Newswire (CAN).

Many international organizations and media communities – both local and foreign – have expressed concern about the situation. Media experts say such attacks on non-state media limit freedom of speech and expression and increase self censorship among Tajik journalists.

“Persecution of citizens, in particular, rights advocates, who use their constitutional freedoms, criticizing the judicial and executive powers, as well as the application of punitive measures against those who freely express their opinions, contradicts the democratic principles and damages Tajikistan’s reputation,” reads the public statement issued by the Tajik Union of Journalists in April.

Last week, editors of the three papers issued a joint statement complaining about violations of the Tajik law by the judges. Nuriddin Karshibaev, chairman of the Tajik National Association of Independent Media (NANSMIT) told CAN that the Tajik Supreme Court ignores statements made by defendants and codefendants.

“The NANSMIT monitoring service closely watches the hearings, and we clearly see numerous violations of legal procedures,” Karshibaev said.

And in a March 30 press release from the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Ambassador Kenneth Gross said, “We are very concerned with freedom of press here in Tajikistan. And what we are hoping for is the court case validates the freedom of press here.

«It is extremely important in any country that the press has the opportunity to report freely what happens, without any restrictions, threats, or punishments through judicial means or otherwise, and we are here today to observe and see what happens in court. Hopefully, the court will uphold the principle of freedom of press.”

For its side of the dispute, Nusratullo Abdulloev, chairman of the Tajikistan Supreme Court speaking at a press conference 19 April in Dushanbe, told the media he was unable to comment on the legal actions against the three Tajik newspapers which are currently being decided.

“I can only evaluate the validity and legitimacy of the court’s verdict when it is made,” he said.

Konstantin Parshin, http://www.centralasianewswire

Источник: http://www.centralasianewswire.com/viewstory.aspx?id=471

Could the recent political upheaval that brought down Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev have a domino effect on other countries in Central Asia?

It’s a question that is being asked in the region in the wake of Kyrgyzstan’s bloody antigovernment demonstrations earlier this month.

The events have been portrayed as a wake-up call to other Central Asian leaders, lest their citizens follow the example set in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. And there are ample similarities between Kyrgyzstan and its fellow Central Asian states to give credence to the suggestion.

The five Central Asian countries all come under criticism in varying degrees over constraints on political freedoms, government pressure on independent media, and free speech. Nepotism and corruption, two key ingredients behind the Kyrgyz unrest, are common complaints across the region.

In Kyrgyzstan, the wave of discontent over Bakiev’s appointment of his children, siblings, and other relatives to key official posts eventually swept his government away. In an ironic twist, it was virtually the same wave Bakiev himself rode to power five years before, when his predecessor, Askar Akaev, was ousted as a result of the Tulip Revolution.

Family Factor

Elsewhere in Central Asia — with the exception of Turkmenistan, where tribal politics reign — members of presidential families control major businesses, banks, and wield enormous influence in politics.

In Uzbekistan, Gulnara Karimova is often touted as a potential successor to her president father, Islam Karimov. The first daughter enjoys a life of fame as a European-based fashion designer, and riches due to her reputed control of the company Zeromax, which oversees a wide range of oil and gas businesses in Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s second daughter, Dinara Kulibaeva, has immense influence over the resource-rich country’s energy sphere along with her husband, Timur Kulibaev, one of the country’s richest men.

In Tajikistan, Rustam Emomali, President Emomali Rahmon’s eldest son, recently made his political debut by gaining a seat on Dushanbe city council, sparking speculation that he is being groomed for the presidency.

In the weeks leading up to the Kyrgyz uprising, citizens became increasing vocal in expressing their belief that the presidential family was expanding its influence and wealth as a result of corruption, while the rest of the country struggled with poverty.

Such sentiments can also be found among ordinary people throughout Central Asia, who often feel their respective governments leave them to deal with poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities on their own.

Lack Of Organized Opposition

Many analyses and commentaries published after the Kyrgyz unrest predicted it wouldn’t be long before people would be demonstrating against their leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere in the region.

«The poverty, corruption, and harsh economic conditions that bred resentment in Kyrgyzstan are also present in abundance in neighboring states,» read a passage from an article posted on eurasia.net on April 21. «None of [Central Asian leaders] can rule out turmoil at home.»

But while a number of similar ingredients can be found in Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, this doesn’t mean they will bring about the same result.

While Kyrgyzstan exhibited signs of a nascent democracy for years — for example, it is the only country in the region in which the opposition has a parliamentary faction — the powers that be in the other Central Asian states have maintained a much tighter grip.
The parliament in Uzbekistan, for example, is filled by ruling party members and their colleagues from other pro-government groups. Turkmenistan still practices a one-party system. In Kazakhstan, all parliamentary seats belong to the pro-presidential Nur Otan party.

Tajikistan’s opposition Islamic Renaissance Party officially held onto its two parliamentary seats following a February election. But for years, even though one of its two legislators was terminally ill and bed-ridden, it wasn’t allowed to replace him with another candidate.

Tajik political analyst Sabur Vahhob says that, compared to Kyrgyzstan, the other Central Asian states lack strong opposition figures. «There aren’t experienced political [opposition] leaders, capable of gathering people around themselves,» he says. «People need a leader whom they can trust, but we can’t see such personalities yet.»

Loyal Security Teams

In addition, while Bakiev’s government in recent years took steps to clamp down on independent media and imprison opposition leaders, it remained the only country in the region where people enjoyed relative freedom to hold antigovernment protests. Bakiev himself, speaking from exile in Minsk last week, implied he didn’t see anything wrong in demonstrations taking place.

Governments across Central Asia have been criticized for restricting political freedom and persecuting their political opponents.

Perhaps the harshest example in recent years came in Uzbekistan, when a rare public demonstration in the eastern town of Andijon in 2005 was brutally suppressed by government forces who fired into the crowd. The government claims 187 people, including police, were killed in the violence, but rights groups say several hundred protesters were killed. Hundreds fled the country following the crackdown, fearing imprisonment.

A key difference between Bakiev and other Central Asian leaders can be found in the people surrounding them. Most of regional leaders have taken firm control over key ministries — security, defense, and interior — by appointing close allies. Even at the level of middle management in the security and law enforcement agencies, only those most loyal to the presidential office can be found.

Bakiev, on the other hand, placed a sibling in charge of the elite presidential guard, but was at odds with his defense minister and onetime ally, Ismail Isakov, whom he eventually imprisoned.

Nervous Silence

The minimal coverage of Kyrgyz events by state-run media in Central Asia is indicative of the efforts taken in the region to prevent any carryover effect. Official media in all Central Asian countries have downplayed the scope and significance of the Kyrgyz events, while the Turkmen media has completely ignored them.
No Central Asian leader has officially recognized the interim government in Bishkek. But that does not mean the events have gone unnoticed by the governments of Central Asia.

When the unrest in Kyrgyz began to unfold, Kazakh President Nazarbaev was vocal in predicting that similar events would not take place in Kazakhstan. According to Nazarbaev, people in his oil-rich country are content with their living standards.

Speaking during the Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty on April 27, Nazarbaev described the situation in Kyrgyzstan as a mere «fight for power.» He added: «It was not a revolution. It was complete banditry.»

‘Preventative Measures’

Others in the region appear to have taken steps designed to ensure a Kyrgyz-like political scenario does not unfold on their territory. Tajikistan appears to be taking the soft approach, while Uzbekistan is reportedly taking a hard line.

In an April 24 address to the nation, Tajik President Rahmon instructed all local government heads to have «open doors» every Saturday to meet with people and listen to their opinions, problems, and complaints.

The Uzbek response has been starkly different. According to RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, law enforcement officials along with neighborhood committees in the southeastern Ferghana Province are asking people to sign «loyalty letters,» promising they will not agitate against the government. Such letters reportedly appeared shortly after the Kyrgyz unrest, and mainly target relatives of dissidents, political activists, and conservative religious people.

If history is any indication, the chances of any export of the revolutionary spirit seen in Kyrgyzstan depend largely on how successful the uprising is at bringing about real democratic change.

The Tulip Revolution five years ago initially brought hope of such change, and was widely welcomed by younger people in Central Asia. But those hopes faded as many expected reforms failed to materialize. This, Kyrgyz say today, merely demonstrated that the 2005 revolution wasn’t about democracy, but simply replaced once corrupt strongman with another.

Likewise, if Kyrgyz hopes once again turn into disenchantment, their neighbors’ criticisms of the «chronic revolutions» in Kyrgyzstan that lead to nothing will only be strengthened.

Farangis Najibullah

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_Kyrgyzstans_Revolution_Ready_For_Export/2027180.html