As another winter of discontent looms in Tajikistan, President Imomali Rahmon’s administration is feeling heat. In response, embattled Tajik officials are lashing out against perceived enemies.

Tajiks struggled to endure last winter’s shortages of electricity and food. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The indicators for the coming winter are looking similarly ominous. For example, officials have already predicted that this year’s grain harvest will fall by roughly 30 percent over the 2007 level, due to drought conditions and widespread pest infestations. A potential second consecutive winter of severe hardships could place Rahmon’s regime on very thin ice.

Aware of its precarious position, the Rahmon administration is evidently trying to carry out preventive strikes against selected political opponents. One such figure is Dodojon Atovullo, the exiled editor of the opposition newspaper Charogi Rouz (Daylight). According to a recent article published by the Russian daily Vremya Novostei, the Tajik Interior Ministry’s Organized Crime Control Unit has renewed an effort to prosecute the editor for anti-state activities. Authorities allege that the 53-year-old Atovullo, who works mainly in Moscow, is guilty of disseminating «insulting accusations against the President and members of the government» and is promoting «the violent overthrow of the constitutional order in Tajikistan.»

Atovullo has lived in exile since 1992. The newspaper that he edits has appeared irregularly in recent years. But Atovullo’s announcement that he was assuming the leadership of the Vatandor (Patriot) Party aroused the Rahmon administration’s ire.

Tajik officials have long been interested in muzzling Atovullo, but Moscow had not been receptive to the idea of shipping him back to Dushanbe — at least until very recently. Conditions have changed dramatically in the weeks following Russia’s incursion into Georgia, the Vremya Novostei article suggested. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Seeking as much diplomatic support as possible for its diplomatic positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia now seems much more interested in making sure Rahmon is happy.

Observers in Moscow have noted that, to date, the Tajik government has remained silent on Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Dushanbe’s reticence could be a ploy to extract maximum political and economic benefits from the Kremlin.

As reported by the Tajik news website Nansmit (www.nansmit.tj), Atovullo told Russian journalists that the initiation of the criminal case against him «became possible after the meeting between the Tajik President Imomali Rahmon and the head of the Kremlin administration Sergei Naryshkin» in mid September. While the two certainly could have touched upon the subject of nettlesome dissenters, the Rahmon-Naryshkin talks in Dushanbe on September 17 focused on the development of joint Tajik-Russian hydropower projects, the Itar-Tass news agency reported.

Russian media outlets say the Kremlin is giving serious consideration to granting Dushanbe’s request to extradite Atovullo. If handed over to Tajik authorities, the opposition editor could face up to a 25-year jail term.

In 2001, Atovullo was detained in Moscow by Russian law enforcement officials, who were acting on a request by Dushanbe. A couple of days later, though, the editor was released and the Russian prosecutor-general’s office refused to press the case. Later, the Tajik prosecutor general’s office closed the case against Atovullo.

Last June, Atovullo caught the attention of Rahmon administration officials with a call for widespread civil disobedience in Tajikistan, with the aim of forcing incumbent authorities from power. Shortly thereafter, Tajik Prosecutor-General Bobojon Bobokhonov denounced Atovullo as «a criminal and information terrorist,» adding that his office would again seek to prosecute the editor.

Atovullo has expressed fear that instead of facing extradition via normal legal channels, he could be «kidnapped,» in other words possibly secreted back to Dushanbe by Tajik security officials, with the Kremlin’s knowledge and acquiescence.

There would appear to be a precedent for such action — a 2005 incident involving Makhmadruzi Iskandarov, the leader of the Tajik opposition Democratic Party, who mysteriously disappeared in Moscow in April 2005 only to show up a few weeks later in Dushanbe in official custody. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Posted September 29, 2008 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org

EurasiaNet

Источник: http://eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092908a.shtml

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is using the occasion of today’s European Union-Central Asian security summit in Paris to highlight the lack of press freedom in Central Asia, especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

RSF says Europe should not discuss efforts to combat terrorism or drug trafficking at the summit without also raising human rights issues. Toward that end, the Paris-based media watchdog is staging a protest at the Turkmen Embassy in Paris today to highlight their concerns.

RSF official Elsa Vidal spoke by telephone with RFE/RL today as she and other activists were occupying the office of the Turkmen ambassador to France.

«At the beginning,» Vidal told our Turkmen Service, «we were skeptical of the EU strategy of building a dialogue with dictatorships in Central Asia. But we have seen that some states might be [reached]. And anyway, we want to use every possibility, so what we want is that each time they [meet], they do bring up the question of human rights.»

Vidal noted that a few political prisoners and dissidents have been released in Uzbekistan in the past few months, following European and U.S. pressure. «And that’s a good thing,» she said. «But while they were doing so, they were at the same very moment arresting other journalists and they tortured them. So it’s a very strange period.»

We were skeptical of the EU strategy of building a dialogue with dictatorships in Central Asia. But we have seen that some [objectives] might be achieved.In a statement, the group says a «high price» is paid in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan «for any attempts at independent or critical reporting. Arrests, violence, and harassment of journalists and their families are the methods habitually used by the authorities whenever they are criticized.»

RSF notes that no proper investigation has yet been launched into the death in 2006 of right activist Ogulsapar Muradova, who was also a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service. She died, RSF says, «from blows she received in prison while serving a six-year sentence for helping a French TV journalist to prepare a report.»

Two other activists — Annakurban Amanklychev and Sapardurdy Khajiev — were arrested at the same time as Muradova and were also sentenced to six or seven years in prison. There has been no news of either of them.

In Uzbekistan, journalists and government opponents continue to be harassed.

Solijon Abdurakhmanov, a correspondent for the news website uznews.net, has been held in the western city of Nukus since June 7. His trial, on spurious drug-trafficking charges, began on September 12. He faces 20 years in jail.

As for the other three Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan ranked 125th out of 169 countries in the 2007 Reporters Without Borders world press freedom index; Kyrgyzstan ranked 110th; and Tajikistan ranked 115th. Both Uzbekistan (160th) and Turkmenistan (167th) were in the last 10.

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/Content/EU_Urged_To_Discuss_Press_Freedoms_At_Central_Asian_Summit/1201020.html

Many people were shocked when journalist Nasir Fayaz, the host of the program «Haqiqat» (Truth) on Afghanistan’s private Ariana television, was detained for unsubstantiated critical statements he made about members of Afghanistan’s cabinet.

Afghan journalists unions, international organizations such as Reporters Without Borders, and political institutions like the Afghan National Assembly all condemned Fayaz’s arrest. Those expressions of outrage and solidarity finally forced the government to release Fayaz.

On the one hand, now for the first time in the history of Afghanistan dozens of FM radio stations, up to 15 private television stations, and scores of newspapers and magazines are available. Such media diversity fuels hope and optimism for the growth of democracy in Afghanistan.

But on the other hand, some of these media outlets represent various interests — warlords, specific religious groups or political parties, even foreign countries. And with the arrest of Fayaz by the National Security Directorate, hope and optimism gave way to frustration and even despair.

The Afghan Constitution and the UN Declaration of Human Rights — to which Afghanistan is a signatory — guarantee freedom of the media. That freedom gives people the opportunity to take part in political life by criticizing the government and expressing their views.

Just as importantly, a free press is a tool for keeping checks on politicians and maintaining a balance. But in order to keep the criticism and these diverging views civil and to maintain perspective, societies have principles and governments have laws that must be not only considered, but respected.

It is possible that Ariana TV’s Fayaz may have breached such principles or rules. He harshly criticized two cabinet members and accused a high-ranking government official of theft and corruption, without providing any credible evidence to substantiate those accusations. Such actions constitute a serious attack on the integrity of these officials.

Some would argue that Fayaz abused the freedom of expression that he is guaranteed by the constitution.

But even though the government is responsible for defending the credibility and integrity of its officials against such accusations, in this case its repressive action against Fayaz is unacceptable. By the same token, the reaction of the media and other organizations and individuals in calling for Fayaz’s release seems justified.

According to Afghan media law, the Information Ministry’s Commission for Press Complaints is responsible for addressing such alleged violations by journalists.

In Fayaz’s case, it would have been wise for the Afghan government to task the commission with investigating the veracity of Fayaz’s allegations. The decision to have him detained for three days was neither for the cabinet nor for the National Security Directorate to make.

Akbar Ayazi is the director of RFE/RL’s Radio Free Afghanistan and Hashem Mohmand is a Radio Free Afghanistan broadcaster. The views expressed in this commentary are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

Akbar Ayazi, Hashem Mohmand, Radio Liberty

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/Content/Afghan_Journalist_Abuse_Media_Freedom/1189171.html

Muhammadi Rakhmatullo is the head of Salafiyyah, an unregistered religious organization in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe. Educated in a Pakistani madrasah, Rakhmatullo is known as Mullah Muhammadi in Tajikistan and is one of the country’s Salafi leaders.

He and his fellow members — most of whom are young men in their 20s and early 30s — differ from most other Tajik men. They all have beards and wear their trousers rolled up. Those signs show that they practice Salafism, a form of Islam that is quite different from Hanafism, the traditional, more liberal brand of Islam practiced by the huge majority of Tajiks.

But it is not the look of the Salafis that concerns people. It is not even their growing presence in mosques and the differences in the way they pray and perform other religious rituals.

Some devout Hanafi Muslims — including Islamic scholars and Tajik officials — seem most worried by the growing influence and exclusionism of the Salafis. The danger, they say, is that Salafis see themselves as the purest Muslims and exclude others, renouncing many kinds of Islam — Shi’ism and Sufism among them.

Rakhmatullo claims that 20,000 people have joined his organization in Tajikistan in recent years, and the number of Salafis coming to Friday Prayers — including to the biggest central mosque in Dushanbe, Imam At-Termezi — has been rising steadily.

Rakhmatullo and other Salafis shy away from the media. However, Salafi ideology is widely disseminated in brochures and other such materials available on the streets and in bookstores at mosques. Reports say Salafis distribute nearly 6,000 audio and videotapes, books, and brochures every week.

One of the videos features Rakhmatullo giving an anti-Iran speech. He is also very critical of Tajik officials who say that Tajiks and Iranians are brothers (they share the same language and ethnicity).

«Even my [Muslim] brothers [from Tajikistan] did not prove useful to me. So why would I want other ‘brothers’ to come from Iran?» Rakhmatullo said. «Look, there are 7 million people in Tajikistan. Half of them are men. A million and a half out of 3.5 million are children. Another million Tajiks are in Russia. Only 1 million [Tajik men are] left in Tajikistan. Out of them, only 225,000 attend Friday Prayers. The rest are an absolutely useless bunch of people.»

Salafis advocate a pure form of Islam that is said to be similar to that practiced by the earliest generations of Muslims starting with the Prophet Muhammad (Salaf means «ancestors» or «early generations» in Arabic).

Salafis renounce innovations, alterations, and additions that were added in succeeding centuries to their «pure» form of Islam.

The Salafis’ rejection of Sufism has caused resentment among many Tajiks because Sufism has strong roots in Tajikistan.

Most Tajiks are Sunnis, although about 5 percent of Tajiks belong to the Shi’a minority of the Islamiliyyah sect in the remote Pamir Mountains.

Some believe Salafism is similar to Wahabbism, and many people use those terms interchangeably. Even the habit of rolled-up pants is similar to the Wahhabi custom in former Soviet republics for adherents to wear their pants three centimeters shorter than normal.

Some say Wahhabis in Central Asia and the Caucasus used the name «Salafi» to mask any connections to Wahhabism and the official repercussions that could be made against them because of the negative association that comes with Wahhabism. But Salafis deny that claim, pointing out that Wahhabism is based on the teachings of a cleric from the 18th century, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab.

The head of the Interior Ministry in Soghd Province, Abdurahim Kakhharov, said on June 30 that Salafis must be controlled «because they are associates of Wahhabis.»

The ideas and practices of Wahabbism — an Islamic doctrine of the ruling royal dynasty in Saudi Arabia — first came to the former Soviet republics in the 1980s.

Authorities often use the term Wahabbism to describe various Islamic movements outside state control, and ascribe antigovernment activities to them.

In Tajikistan, the term was discredited among even ordinary people during the 1992-97 bloody civil war in which an Islamic opposition fought the post-Soviet regime.

Because of the Salafis’ anti-Shi’a and anti-Iran positions, there have been allegations that the United States is behind the Salafi movement in Tajikistan.

Hajji Akbar Turajonzoda, a parliamentarian and prominent member of the Islamic opposition, is one of those who claims that the West finances the Salafis. In an April 30 interview with Russia’s Regnum information agency, he claimed Western secret services have instructed Salafis to «fight Shi’ites — more precisely, Iran.»

«Their goal is to create antagonism in society and destroy unity among Muslims,» Turajonzoda said.

He also claimed that the Salafis’ base could not grow without significant financial assistance from «foreign intelligence centers.»

Tracy Jacobson, the U.S. ambassador in Dushanbe, denied the allegations in an interview with RFE/RL’s Tajik Service on July 2.

«This idea that we at the [U.S.] embassy give money to religious groups is a crazy idea,» Jacobson said. «It’s not true, I can assure you. But we do work with the [Tajik] government to support freedom of conscience for all peaceful religious groups. But no, we don’t give money to the Salafi or other groups. I also read the article in which someone said we support Hizb-ut Tahrir and Salafi in order to create divisions within the Islamic world. It’s nothing but propaganda.»

Tajik authorities have been careful not to openly criticize Salafis in the past. However, several high-ranking officials have lately expressed concerns about the growth of the Salafism ideology.

There have been cases in which Salafi literature has been confiscated. The most recent incident came last month when police seized 62 books in a single raid in the southwestern city of Kulob.

Earlier this year, Interior Minister Mahmadnazar Salihov admitted that Salafis had not committed «any unlawful and unconstitutional acts.» He added, however, that Salafi followers are recognized as extremists and are banned in some countries.

Hayrullo Saidov, the prosecutor in the northern Soghd Province, announced on June 30 that authorities plan to strengthen control over the activities of Salafiyyah members in Soghd. Tajik media quoted Saidov as saying that Salafiyyah is «dangerous because it shows itself from its good side first and then gradually becomes dangerous.»

Media have reported that among the confiscated Salafi literature was a pamphlet describing how to keep young people from becoming Shi’ite.

A Kulob government official, Emomali Bulbulov, said that most of the books were high quality and had been printed in Russia. He also said that Salafis promised to pay $200 to nonmembers to distribute the books.

Turajonzoda, who has criticized the Tajik authorities for not taking a harder stance against Salafis, supports the more aggressive attitude by the Tajik government regarding Salafis.

«I heard that the Tajik government, after analyzing and studying this group — and perhaps, they have also got some information from other countries — has ordered that this movement should not be supported and even it should be restricted,» Turajonzoda said. «To some extent, I support this idea, although in my opinion not supporting the movement would be enough.»

Reports indicate that Salafism is also growing in other parts of the former Soviet Union.

Salafiyyah members frequently visit Russia — the main destination for Tajik labor migrants — and disseminate Salafi ideas among them. This comes at a time when many Tajiks have left Islam altogether, as more than 180,000 Tajiks are reported to have converted to other religions in recent years, most of them to Christianity.

RFE/RL’s Tajik Service correspondents Farhodi Milod and Kayumars Ato contributed to this report

By Gulnoza Saidazimova, Radio Free Europe / Radio

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/Content/Article/1186548.html

WASHINGTON — It’s been more than 15 years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, and several states that once were firmly in the Soviet sphere of influence are now members of the European Union and NATO.

But people living in many of the former Soviet republics still face challenges, including getting access to the news that’s taken for granted in the West. That’s according to Christopher Walker, the director of studies at Freedom House, the New York-based human rights advocacy group. He spoke about this persistent problem with RFE/RL correspondent Andrew F. Tully.

RFE/RL: What is the state of the media in former communist countries?

Christopher Walker: In the non-Baltic former Soviet Union, Freedom House findings overall are quite grim. Nevertheless, there are some distinctions among the countries in the region. You have on the weakest end of the scale some of the world’s worst-performing countries. These are retrograde regimes that have not pursued really any meaningful reforms: Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan. And they are among the world’s worst performers, let alone the region’s worst performers.

At the same time you have countries that perform poorly in our analysis, but nevertheless have economic-modernization ambitions. And in this category you might find countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan. And here the question is whether regimes that have economic-modernization ambitions can advance their objectives while suppressing the development of a healthy and mature media sector. And that’s one of the quandaries they confront.

I think what you see is differentiation among the countries in the region, but by our measures you have — just looking at our global press freedom analysis, you’ll find only two countries that are in the «partly free» category, and those are Ukraine and Georgia. The rest of the countries in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union — the other 10 — are rated as «not free.»

Methods Of Control

RFE/RL: Can you give our readers an idea of the methods used in the region to hamper the free flow of information?

Walker: The sorts of controls that you’d find in the «not free» countries run from the sorts of intimidation that all authoritarian governments would rely on. This would be physical abuse in some cases and impunity, where you have brutality against journalists. This sends a very clear message that there are real red lines that can’t be crossed in investigative reporting.

At the same time you also have more sophisticated methods of control today in a number of countries. This would include Russia, where state-managed or state-owned commercial enterprises are now taking control of media enterprises, which then enable dominant power holders to keep their fingers on the management and editorial lines of the news entities that they bring into the fold (under the control of the owner). So this gives another line of control that’s emerged in recent years.

Most of the authorities in these countries have an enormous advantage in making sure that controls are firm by having pliant judiciaries, so that libel laws can be applied generously — in the worst form of that word. Azerbaijan stands out in this respect, where libel laws are being used excessively to bring suits against journalists.

So you really see a variety of tools that are pulled out of the toolbox to keep journalists in check — a very comprehensive, and right now a very effective mix of tools.

RFE/RL: What are the more subtle forms of information repression?

Walker: I think the economic levers are used with greater sophistication and nuance certainly in the countries that are enjoying greater wealth today. And at the top of the list in the former Soviet Union you’d find countries that are benefiting from vast amounts of energy wealth. So Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan would be examples.

What you’ve seen is economic levers being used to control editorial lines to quietly or behind-the-scenes manipulate editorial coverage so that serious investigative issues aren’t pursued, so that the authorities aren’t scrutinized in a meaningful way. That would probably be one of the principal, more nuanced methods for controlling the media today.

Fighting Corruption With Blunt Tools

RFE/RL: We keep seeing reports out of countries such as Russia in which average citizens express a lack of concern for their government’s human rights record, arguing that they’re more interested in stability imposed today by a strong leader and are willing to wait a while for a government that’s more responsive to its people. Does this attitude include a lack of concern for a free press?

Walker: There are very practical reasons why these societies desperately need a greater media freedom. And the issue that’s at the top of the list is corruption. And it’s difficult to imagine how any of these [governmental] systems can start to make meaningful headway on corruption, absent a more open and vibrant media. It’s a critical linchpin for making progress against corruption in all of these settings.

If you look at Russia today, the leadership in the country has put corruption way up the agenda. [But] how this is brought under control, absent an opening in the media and having a more meaningful discussion of government policies and government behavior is very difficult to envision. And I think in a very practical way having a more vibrant and open media is a critical «sine qua non» for making headway on the corruption issue, and I think also, more fundamentally, on having more responsive governance.

RFE/RL: Yet after the earthquake in China, when many children were crushed in the collapse of shoddily built schools, the people publicly berated Communist Party leaders whom they held responsible. And yet China is a country whose people, like many Russians, tend to put up with an authoritarian government for the sake of stability. In a sense, aren’t they crying out for more information?

Walker: I think the common thread in the issues you just described is when issues of corruption touch people’s lives in a real way. And certainly the school-construction issue in China has done exactly that. People take notice, and in these instances people are hungry for more rather than less information. And, in fact, in that case the Chinese journalists courageously reported on these issues against the edicts of the central government.

I think what you see in these authoritarian settings, where such a premium is placed on controlling the media, is that at the top of the issue list that they seek to control are issues relating to corruption, environmental degradation — things that touch people’s lives on a day-to-day basis. That suggests that, at root, ordinary people really do have a desire and a hunger for meaningful information on issues that touch their lives, and it’s information they should have.

Radio Free Europe

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/Content/Free_Press_Elusive_In_Former_Soviet_States/1185917.html

When an influential brother-in-law of President Emomali Rahmon mysteriously disappeared in April, the ensuing media coverage surprised many Tajiks.

It was notable because speculation mounted that Hasan Sadulloev had been murdered.

But it was more remarkable for its sheer volume, since such topics have long been taboo under the watchful eyes of the Rahmon administration.

Rahmon might not garner the headlines of Central Asia’s most conspicuous enemies of the free press, but Tajik authorities’ fierce defense of the president and his image have left little room for genuine public scrutiny of Rahmon, his policies, or his family.

Throughout much of the past decade, ordinary Tajiks have rarely voiced frustration with the government or head of state in the form of public protests. Demonstrations have been almost unheard of despite widespread poverty, rampant unemployment, and corruption.

Journalists who chose to challenge the country’s leaders have faced serious retaliation — in the form of beatings, firings, or closures of their publications.

But several protests have been held recently in the capital, Dushanbe, as well as in cities like Kulob, Panjakent, and Khorog. In one case, the appointment of a local official prompted a rally.

«People are not afraid of the government’s retaliation anymore,» says 22-year-old Safar, from the eastern Badakhshan region. «What else can happen to us? With a university diploma in my pocket, I have to work like a slave in Russia, because I don’t have any — literally any — job opportunities in Tajikistan. The situation can’t possibly get any worse than this.»

The attitudes of many Tajiks appear to have shifted recently, with skyrocketing food prices and energy shortages that left people freezing to death in their homes during the coldest winter in living memory.

«People have to demand their rights through lawful ways,» Safar says, «and this is the only way out of the situation for us.»

Such refrains evoke a familiar Tajik expression that «there is no color darker than black.»

Years Of Silence

Some observers ascribe citizens’ apparent reluctance to speak out critically to caution in light of the fact that Tajiks took to the streets in the early 1990s to change the political system in protests that helped spark a bloody five-year civil war.

That theory appeared to hold true for several years after peace was established in 1997, as Rahmon dominated one set of flawed elections after another. At the same time, presidential friends and relatives took over many of country’s major businesses, while an estimated 1 million people — one-sixth of the country’s population — chose to migrate to Russia for work to support their families.

Rahmatullo Valiev, the deputy head of Tajikistan’s Democratic Party, tells RFE/RL that he believes Tajiks have had enough and realize that they no longer have anything to lose by protesting.

«People are tired of this situation, and the general impression is that the government is not capable of doing anything for them,» Valiev says. «People take to the streets to demand their rights, saying they want a better life, better salaries, and so on.»

Journalists and commentators have joined the chorus of public expressions of unhappiness with Rahmon and other government officials.

A commentary in the weekly «Nigoh» last month accused the government and the president’s office of «favoring certain groups» and thus compounding the problem. «Managerial and other key positions are only given to wealthy people with connections, and it adds to people’s dissatisfaction and their distrust of the government,» «Nigoh» charged.

Many Tajiks complain that not only does the government appear incapable of creating jobs, corrupt government employees prevent people who want to set up businesses from creating new sources of income.

The weekly «Farazh» in June quoted the leader of the Social Democrat Party, Rahmatullo Zoirov, as claiming that «Tajikistan has never before been in such deep crisis.» He added, «There is not any improvement in Tajikistan and the government offices do not carry out their duties.»

Farangis Najibullah, Radio Free Europe

Источник: http://www.rferl.org/content/Tajik_Public_Press_Break_Decade_Silence/1183846.html

A month after the suspicious disappearance of wealthy banker Hasan Sadulloev — the brother-in-law of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon — Tajik state television claims to have aired recent footage of the missing man.

During a report covering Rahmon’s trip to the eastern town of Roghun over the weekend, the television channel broadcast a video of a man it identified as Sadulloev, the 40-year-old head of Orienbank, apparently listening to Rahmon’s speech.

Under normal circumstances, it would have been the usual footage of an important bank director accompanying the president on a domestic trip, as Sadulloev often did.

But Sadulloev’s recent absence from the public eye has been surrounded by speculation that he was shot by President Rahmon’s son, Sadulloev’s nephew, in early May during an argument over control of Orienbank, one of the largest financial institutions in Tajikistan.

Regional websites reported that Sadulloev died from his wounds, while some local media suggested that he was flown to hospital in Germany and has been recovering there.

Orienbank officials have maintained from the beginning of his disappearance that their boss is «alive and well,» despite the fact that the well-known business mogul has not been seen in public since the alleged shooting incident.

The TV footage was followed by a short report from the state-run Khovar news agency that Sadulloev has been outside of Tajikistan on business trips for the past three weeks. It did not give any details of the purported meetings and it was unclear where Sadulloev was traveling.

Public Mistrust

It seems that neither the video footage nor the news agency report has succeeded in convincing the public that nothing has happened to Sadulloev.

Shokirjon Hakimov, a politician and department head at the Tajik Institute of International Relations in Dushanbe, tells RFE/RL that «the indistinct footage and report have actually fueled more suspicion and mistrust among the public.»

«The conduct that Hasan Sadulloev’s press office has chosen is not compatible with modern society’s demands,» Hakimov says. «Besides, it’s not benefiting them either, because now other news sources have taken the initiative, and, as a result, many secrets about the president’s relatives have been made public. Of course, some of that information might be baseless.»

Hakimov says that in the face of multiplying rumors, Sadulloev — if he is indeed alive and well — should have made at least one public appearance.

Many ordinary Tajiks agree that Sadulloev would be expected to appear in public to end the wild stories about him and the president’s family, which are certainly hurting their reputations. Instead, state television recently invited a cleric on air who tried to convince viewers that Sadulloev is safe and sound.

Despite the burning interest among the public to know what really happened within the first family, journalists in Tajikistan have not dared to ask the president about it. Although there have been several public meetings with Rahmon since Sadulloev’s disappearance, not one reporter present has used the opportunity to query the president about the issue.

Seeing Double

The secrecy within the presidential family and the great difficulty in obtaining information has prompted another rumor about Sadulloev and his alleged television appearance. Some Tajik journalists and officials reportedly say that a person who bears a striking resemblance to Sadulloev has appeared at some government meetings lately, although «he sits far from the others surrounded by bodyguards and does not speak at all,» according to one report.

And they strongly suspect that the man might be Hasan Sadulloev’s identical twin brother, Hussein, who must be filling in for the banker while he is receiving treatment for his wounds.

In Tajik culture, Hasan is the name traditionally given to one of a pair of twin boys.

Allegations that Sadulloev’s twin brother Hussein is appearing as Hasan could not be confirmed by official sources.

Hakimov criticized authorities for what he called «withholding information from the public and manipulating it.» «Even if something very bad happened inside the first family, it would be much better for the president’s reputation if it was admitted openly and clearly,» he said.

In the past, Tajikistan’s independent media, such as the weekly «Charoghi ruz,» have reported alleged disagreements within the presidential family over power and money. Some reports claim that Rahmon’s family has been wary of Sadulloev’s growing influence both in financial and political circles.

Sadulloev, whose sister is married to the president, rose in a relatively short period from his job as a village gas-station attendant to become one of the wealthiest people in the country.

According to reports, Sadulloev’s business empire includes some 13 ventures in Tajikistan, including five cotton mills, several factories, and at least three food-processing companies. His business dealing also include real-estate developments, transport, media, insurance companies, and banking.

Posted June 8, 2008 © Eurasianet

Farangis Najibullah

Источник: http://www.eurasianet.org

Power shortages and high food prices in Tajikistan are causing concern in the West about the stability of the country of 7 million people.

Russia, which sees Tajikistan as a buffer guarding its traditional sphere of interest in the region, is also watching the nation closely for signs of trouble. The former Soviet republic has largely been calm since the end of a civil war that killed tens of thousands of people in the 1990s, but its economy has been shattered and its utilities are crumbling.

Some Western diplomats say the situation in Tajikistan, a strategically important country in the global fight against drug trafficking, is at a critical point after power shortages which they say left many people feeling abandoned by the government. «The discontent is real,» a senior Western diplomat said. «We’ve had government officials tell us things such as ‘We are lucky we’re still here after last winter’.»

«People are suffering quite severely,» another Western ambassador said.
President Imomali Rakhmon, elected in 1994 and de facto head of state since 1992, tolerates little dissent. Referring to the next scheduled presidential election, the Western ambassador said: «I don’t think they are going to be reconciled by the fact that in five years time they can always vote for somebody else.»

Consumer prices rose 19.7 percent in 2007. Gross domestic product grew by 3.2 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2008, compared to 7.8 percent growth in 2007.

«There is nothing we can do. We are simply trying to survive,» said Khikoyat, a mother of six who lives in a small mud-brick house outside the capital Dushanbe. «A lot of people live without electricity and there is almost no water to grow crops. It is very difficult.» The government began daily rationing of electricity and gas this winter to help millions of Tajiks survive harsh weather, although supplies have now been partially restored. Electricity is produced domestically, mostly by hydroelectric plants, but power generation suffered this winter when rivers froze. Fuel has to be imported from neighbouring countries to cover any deficit.

In the summer, Tajikistan generates more than enough power but has problems selling it to neighbours because of a poor infrastructure and lower seasonal consumption across the region. Tajikistan’s problems are compounded by the fact it lies on the main heroin trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe. This fuels corruption and a violent shadow economy.

Diplomats, already concerned by the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, are reluctant to predict what form frustrations may take in a country where the opposition movement is weak and fragmented. «We’ve all got an interest in staying in Tajikistan and making sure it doesn’t become a failed state,» said a Western ambassador who asked not to be named. «It’s not the area in the world where you can afford to have a country that’s gone wrong.»

The diplomats estimate that up to 1 million Tajiks have left their homeland in search of a better life, particularly in Russia, to help their families survive. Up to two thirds of the economy relies on remittances from Tajiks working abroad. Diplomats call the remittances «staying alive money».
«There are almost no real jobs, no nothing,» said Makhmadnabi Shamsiddinov, who spends most of the year working in Russia. «My wife works on a local farm and her wage is just enough to buy some butter and milk.»

Dushanbe, a city of 1 million people, is largely quiet. But many houses bear the bullet scars of the fighting in the 1990s.

REUTERS

Источник: REUTERS

Mystery continues to engulf Tajikistan’s first family, which appears preoccupied with a destabilizing power struggle. The continuing uncertainty surrounding the president and his close relatives suggests that a bout of instability could be in the offing for Central Asia’s poorest nation.

In recent days, people close to Khasan Sadulloyev — one of the most powerful men in Tajikistan, as well as President Imomali Rahmon’s brother-in-law — have vigorously denied rumors circulating in Dushanbe that he was shot and killed in early May by Rahmon’s son Rustam. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the same time, Sadulloyev has not been seen in public since the supposed shooting occurred.
In comments made to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Umed Davlatzoda, the deputy chairman of Orienbank, an entity controlled by Sadulloyev, derided reports of the shooting, attributing them to the «tattling» of idle gossipers. «We would come up with an official denial, if the story came from a [credible] source,» Davlatzoda said. The bank official insisted Sadulloyev is «safe and sound.»
Regardless of whether Sadulloyev is alive or dead, the mere existence of the rumor has the potential to inflict a mortal wound on Rahmon’s administration. An important element in any authoritarian regime is the aura of invincibility. The Sadulloyev controversy is stoking the impression that the presidential clan is gripped by dysfunction. Within the Soviet and post-Soviet context, a leader who is not able to exhibit mastery over developments, or who shows any sign of weakness or hesitation, traditionally has faced a strong and often successful challenge to his authority. The most recent example of the «weak Tsar» syndrome leading to regime change was Askar Akayev’s downfall in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Helping to fan speculation about instability at the top of Tajikistan’s political pyramid, Rahmon did not attend public ceremonies held in connection with the Victory Day holiday on May 9.
Conjecture about Rahmon’s grip on power has been building since last November, when a bomb ripped apart the official car of Maj. Gen. Rajabali Rakhmonaliyev, the head of Tajikistan’s National Guard, which essentially serves as Rahmon’s personal self-defense force. Rakhmonaliyev was not in the car at the time, and was unscathed in the incident. Days later, a bomb blast rocked downtown Dushanbe outside a conference center where a European Union-organized gathering had been due to take place. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Authorities immediately said the incident had a «terrorist» connection, but some regional analysts in retrospect suggest that the bombing might have been connected to a brewing power struggle.
On November 16, 2007, an analysis posted on the Ariana news website — which focuses on political, economic and social developments in Tajikistan — indicated that potential successors to Rahmon were vying to position themselves for a possible «forced change of the elite.» The commentary described Rakhmonaliyev as one of the main contenders to succeed Rahmon, adding that the car bombing was designed to remove him from the succession picture.
Sadulloyev also was identified as a top presidential possibility. Other possible candidates, according to the Ariana analysis, were: Dushanbe Mayor Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloyev; Amirsho Miraliyev, a top presidential aide; and Nuriddin Rahmonov, a presidential relative who wields vast influence over the personnel policy of the governmental bureaucracy.
Rumors that Rahmon was ill seemed to drive speculation about a possible political change back in November. Six months later, however, an image of incompetence has cloaked Rahmon administration, stoked by the troubles experienced by Tajikistan last winter, when the country suffered for prolonged periods without power and heat. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The winter of discontent has been followed by a spring of fury, as many Tajiks have grown alarmed by the skyrocketing cost of staples, especially bread. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The shifting perception of the government’s ability to provide for the population would seem to leave Rahmon in a more vulnerable position than ever before.
Some analysts speculate that Rustam Rahmon’s supposed involvement in the mysterious episode concerning Sadulloyev could be connected with an attempt to thrust himself into the purported line of succession. Little is known about the younger Rahmon, who is believed to be in his early 20s. He reportedly studied in the United States.
Regional political analysts say that, given a total information blackout maintained by officials, there is no way to independently confirm whether Sadulloyev was in fact shot, and, if he was, whether he survived. Regardless, political developments in Tajikistan in the coming weeks and months will merit scrutiny. At this stage, history is not on Rahmon’s side.
Posted May 16, 2008 © Eurasianet

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Channeling the spirit of Joseph Stalin, officials in Tajikistan, Central Asia’s poorest state, have asked residents in the capital Dushanbe to give up part of their salaries «voluntarily» to help finance construction of a hydropower plant.

The fear of government reprisals is compelling many Tajiks to comply.
Makhmadsaid Ubaidullayev, the speaker of the upper chamber of Tajikistan’s parliament, as well as mayor of Dushanbe, first broached the idea of public contributions on April 29. He indicated that if every working individual in Dushanbe donated half of his/her salary for May and June, the state could raise roughly $10 million. Confident of a positive response, Ubaidullayev immediately instructed government agencies and state enterprises to withhold 50 percent of the salaries normally due employees.
For many working outside the public sector, Ubaidullayev’s request seemed absurd, given that government mismanagement is a major factor in the country’s current socio-economic crisis. Still, few people are willing to risk non-compliance. Government institutions are believed to be keeping track of who contributes and who doesn’t. Thus, many believe that those not obeying Ubaidullayev’s informal directive, especially if they operate small- or medium-sized businesses, will pay a far higher price in the very near future, via audits by the tax inspectorate or other legal difficulties.
Local observers say the move is certain to fuel anger and a sense of hopelessness among a large portion of Tajikistan’s population, which endured the misery associated with a severe lack of heating and power during last winter’s deep freeze. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Officials suggest that the money, raised by what amounts to an arbitrary and confiscatory tax, will be used to help finance the Rogun hydroelectric power plant, a long-stalled project that could shore up Tajikistan energy security. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Experts, however, say that the $10 million projected to be raised from the coerced assessment is monetarily insignificant given that, according to some estimates, it will take $1.5 billion to finish the Rogun project. Government officials, meanwhile, put the cost of completion at $550 million. Regardless of the construction costs, the government’s action is unjustifiable when considering that it stands to cause severe hardships for tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Tajiks.
A recent admission made by Shukurjon Zukhurov, the minister of labor and social protection, helps to illustrate the pain inflicted on the population. Zukhurov admitted that more than a half of Tajikistani live below the poverty line. The minimal monthly salary in Tajikistan is 20 somoni (less than $6), and the average salary at the beginning of 2008 was 213 somoni (about $60). Even in normal times, many Dushanbe residents would be hard-pressed to cover gaps created by what is effectively the theft of a month’s salary. But these are not normal times for Tajikistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The country is still reeling from the hardships created by the winter weather. On top of that, government malfeasance seems to have created a debt time-bomb. Over the past three years, the country’s external debt has almost doubled, climbing to $1.2 billion from about $683 million in 2005. How President Imomali Rahmon’s administration will be able to meet its debt obligations remains a mystery, as the government’s annual budget amounts to an estimated $700 million.
From the popular perspective, the situation is already dire. The country is suffering from runaway inflation, driven mainly by the rapid rise in prices for basic foodstuffs. According to data compiled by the State Statistics Committee, the cost of basic food products rose by about 20 percent in 2007. Unofficial data suggests that rising prices made a much steeper ascent, with the cost of some items rising by as much as 500 percent. Tajikistan’s overall inflation rate in 2007 was pegged at 19.7 percent.
The combination of poverty and inflation are threatening to create a social catastrophe. According to a recent statement issued by the UN World Food Program, 550,000 Tajiks are suffering from malnutrition, and roughly 260,000 are in need of «emergency assistance.» The UN agency said about two-thirds of Tajiks were living in poverty.
Rather than take action that could alleviate the food crisis, the government literally seems preoccupied with cosmetic issues. On April 29, the same day Ubaidullayev was announcing the dam tax, President Rahmon issued a ban on tinting car windows.
Public anger might not be so great over making «voluntary» contributions to state coffers, if citizens believed the money would be devoted to the intended purpose. But many believe their hard-earned somonis will simply disappear into the country’s vast sinkhole of official corruption.
Several important pieces of evidence of corrupt practices have come to light in recent months. Perhaps the most notorious instance concerns the International Monetary Fund’s demand, made in March, that the Tajik government repay $47 million in loans. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On April 30, Tajik officials were compelled to agree to a joint monitoring program to monitor the future activities of the National Bank of Tajikistan, which had been accused by the IMF of fraudulent practices in connection with the loans.
Many Tajiks have also been shocked to learn that Rahmon’s administration has paid over $120 million in legal fees over the past three years to a British law firm in connection with an embezzlement case involving the Tajik Aluminum Plant. According to papers filed with a London court, the British firm continues to bill the Tajik government $11 million every month.
Given the depths of government venality, some observers note with irony that southern Tajikistan in recent weeks has been best by a plague of locusts. Over 76,000 hectares of arable land has been consumed by the pests so far. In all, about 200,000 hectares of cotton and wheat fields are under threat, according to the Asia-Plus news agency.

Posted May 7, 2008 © Eurasianet
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